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IN LUCE TUA

Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Address to the Freshman Class
To the young men and women of the Class of 1989 of Valparaiso University:
You have already learned that adults-parents,
teachers, authority figures of every kind-find it impossible to let pass any occasion that offers them the
opportunity to instruct you in the conduct of your
lives. I hope that you have by now also learned to indulge them-us-in this relatively harmless form of
compulsive behavior. We do it not, as you might expect, because we assume it will affect what you think
or do, at least in any immediate sense. Adults can believe many foolish things, but none of us believes
either in the tooth fairy or in the efficacy of advice offered to teenagers.
Why, then , do we persist? Because, as I have already
suggested, we cannot help it. We know that such behavior is somehow expected of us-even by you-and
we want, if nothing else, to offer some sort of statement for the record. We need , God help us, to be able
if necessary to say, to you and to ourselves, that we
told you so. The words that follow may therefore be
viewed primarily as an exercise in psychological
therapy on the part of their author. That may or may
not make them more palatable.
You will be relieved to know that I have no intention of telling you that these are the best days of your
lives and that you should act accordingly. For some of
you they will be-which is rather sad when you come
to think of it-but for others they may well be among
the most miserable, and you ought to be prepared for
that. I remember one fellow in my freshman dorm
who spent a good part of the fall semester huddled
under his bed and who never came back after Christmas vacation. I hope he had better days later on. Your
college experience will not likely be that traumatic, but
it will not probably be one long exhilaration either. I
have never understood why adults should burden
young people by suggesting to them that it ought to
be.
You may also count it a blessing that I do not propose to advise you concerning love, sex, and related
matters. Such advice, if it is to be given at all, should
be given in private on an individual basis. Besides, I
am not at all sure that mature years lead to mature
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views on the subject. Most adults I know, at least most
male adults, are not all that wise when it comes to sex.
They are simply a bit less feverish about it than they
once were, and that can sometimes pass for wisdom.
In any case, few people in my acquaintance, young or
old, have been able to benefit from others' experience
in such matters; here , if nowhere else, we must learn
for ourselves.
Learning for yourself will be in many ways the central theme of your next four years-about affairs of
the heart, affairs of the mind, affairs of the spirit and
will, indeed about all those things that go together to
make up what will constitute your central project: the
making of a self. That's an enormously complicated
and protracted exercise, of course, one that began well
before you got here and that will extend well into the
years after you leave. In some ways, it will never end.
But most of the people I know agree that their college
years were particularly crucial to the formation of
their own identities, and it is reasonable to assume that
the same will be true for most of you.
The making of a self with which one can comfortably live involves, along with a great many other things,
arriving at some fundamental decisions concerning
work, politics, and religious faith. None of these things
is at the heart of what a university, as university, concerns itself with, but your university experience will be
an impoverished one if you do not, in your years here,
grapple seriously with all three of them. In the limited
space available to me, I want to offer some brief observations on each of them for your consideration.
Work at its worst is what we subject ourselves to

Special Notice
This is the third of the four issues of The Cresset
that the VU Alumni Association is sending free of
charge to alumni during 1985. The Alumni Association hopes that this experimental venture will provide a
service to the alumni, the Cresset, and the University.
Comments on this venture are invited and should be addressed either to Walter Kretzmann, President of the
Alumni Association, or to Richard Koenig, Vice President for Public and Alumni Affairs, at Valparaiso
University, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383.
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only in order to keep ourselves and those for whom
we are responsible from destitution. I can imagine few
experiences more dreary than those in which work
amounts to no more than that. It is not a question of
prestige or income level. Many people find meaning
and satisfaction in jobs that others would deem menial
or insufficiently rewarded, even as there are a great
many well-paid individuals for whom work IS a continuing experience in misery and futility.

Yours appears to be a silent
generation, as politically apathetic
as was my own in the late 1950s. You
need less to be turned away from
intensity than roused up from apathy.
Your generation has a reputation concerning work
that precedes you. We have been told that you are
narrow materialists, yuppies in the making for whom
vocation has meaning only in terms of its financial
pay-off. I have doubts on thilt score; the students of
this generation seem to me oriented less to the imperatives of the bottom line than to yearnings for economic security and, to a lesser extent, for possibilities
of leisure and pleasure. These things are not to be
considered among the final ends of man, but neither
are they, unless they become idols, evils in themselves.
The dangers that present themselves to your generation, therefore, are not so much materialist as instrumentalist. Work can become valued not for itself
but for its use as a means to desirable ends. But that
can make sense only in the short run; work will be too
central to your lives for it to be relegated to secondary
purposes. Take great care in choosing your occupation, and do not lock yourself into one too soon. Much
of what we are and of how we value ourselves is
bound up in our work; to have found useful and satisfying work is to have gone a long way toward creating
a livable self. Be as careful about it as you expect to
be in choosing a spouse. It is no less important.
It is only for a very few of you that politics will fill
a place in your lives at all equivalent to that of your
work. That is as it should be. Few prospects are more
chilling than that of a fully politicized community. Indeed, a society forced to choose between widespread
political indifference and widespread political intensity
would be well advised, for the sake of its stability and
social peace, to learn to live with indifference.
But I strongly suspect that for the overwhelming
majority of you excessive political commitment poses
no danger. Quite the reverse. Yours appears to be a
4

silent generation, as politically apathetic as was my
own in the late 1950s. You need less to be turned
away from intensity than roused up from apathy. Consider this: under the conditions of modernity, in which
politics determines so much, to be indifferent to politics is to be indifferent to life, at least life at it exists
anywhere beyond the purely private. For Christians,
vocation implies more than work; it suggests the doing
of God's larger work in society. And that means,
among other things, politics.
What is called for-and it requires a delicate balance-is commitment to politics without moral
zealotry. A politics bereft of moral foundations is a
bankrupt politics, yet we need always to remember
that most political issues are morally ambiguous and
call for debate and resolution in terms of prudential
considerations rather than moral imperatives. The
ends we seek in politics are various and not always
commensurable with each other (e.g., freedom and
equality), and even when our goals are morally indisputable (e.g. avoidance of nuclear war, an end to
apartheid in South Africa) the means by which they
might be achieved are seldom easily discerned and not
often susceptible to simple moral judgment. We need,
in short, to recognize how urgent our political choices
are and yet maintain toward them an attitude of moral
humility. And as Christians, we ought always keep in
mind the proximate and contingent nature of politics:
the Kingdom toward which our lives are pointed will
never be realized within the political order.
The sense of transcendence and the knowledge of
where it can and cannot be found should protect
Christians (though it does not always do so) from the
temptations of political religion. For most universities,
that is not a significant question; it is here. While this
is a university rather than a theological seminary or a
bible college, it takes theological questions seriously,
and it expects its students to do so as well. It is not
our business, as a university , to be concerned with the
state of your souls, but as a university community, we do
have that concern.
It follows from this that it is the distinctive purpose
of this place to demonstrate to its students that serious
intellectual inquiry is not inconsistent with serious
Christian commitment. For a university that aspires to
academic eminence in a militantly secular intellectual
environment, that is an odd, even quixotic, burden to
assume. Yet we do so without reluctance or apology.
We truly are fools for Christ, and we summon you to
join us in our foolishness. It would be dishonest of us
to promise to make religious belief easy for you , but
we can promise to summon all our energies to help
you make of yourselves men and women of faith as
well as of intellectual and professional competence. tl
The Cresset

THE ACADEMIC VOCATION REVISITED
A Symposium on Teaching, Learning, and Publishing

(Editor's Note: The April and May issues of The Cresset
featured Mark R. Schwehn's two-part essay on "Academics as
a Vocation." The widespread response to that essay indicated
that the issues it raised were of such fundamental importance
to the academic enterprise that they warranted further investigation. The Cresset therefore commissioned the following
essays from Leon R. Kass, jonathan Z. Smith, Richard
jungkuntz, Richard John Neuhaus, and Martin E. Marty--as well as a response from Mr. Schwehn. We thank our distinguished contributors for their willingness to participate in
this symposium and we trust that their essays will stimulate
our readers to their own further reflections on the issues presented.)

Leon R. Kass
In his wide-ranging and thought-provoking article,
"Academics as a Vocation," Mark Schwehn explores
the failure of the modern academy to provide a decent, let alone honorable, home for the activity of
teaching. He first proposes an institutional remedydistinctive teaching and publishing faculties, each selfselected-and defends his proposal against likely criticism, theoretical and practical. He then traces the
present hegemony of research-and-publishing to the
thought of Max Weber, which he begins to challenge
in the name of a certain understanding of tradition,
especially in regard to Christian universities. I share
deeply Schwehn's concerns for teaching and community and find myself nodding in agreement with much
that he says. But, in my opinion, neither the remedy
proposed nor the underlying analysis go far enough.
The following comments are offered as friendly, if
more radical, amendments, intended to advance the
discussion, primarily of the subjects of teaching and
tradition.
I begin with a practical difficulty. Schwehn's proposal for separate faculties is not intended for all
academic institutions. He is apparently quite content
(in my view, mistakenly) with the present emphasis on
original research and publication "at universities and
September, 1985

elite colleges," where he discerns "no systematic problem." Yet it is precisely these places that train the vast
majority of faculty for all academic institutions. So
long as these prestigious institutions set the standard,
so long as their graduates are reared in the ethos of
original, specialized research (under the threat of publish or perish), and so long as the colleges treat a
Ph.D. from such universities as the indispensable prerequisite for faculty appointment, no important reform can be accomplished at any college or university.
Schwehn himself admits as much (e.g., "To expect a
recent Ph.D. to think otherwise [than that publication
is all] would be the same as expecting a recent law
school graduate to think like an engineer"), but he
does not draw the necessary conclusion. Either the
ethos of the graduate schools (and elite colleges) must
themselves be reformed so as to take teaching seriously, or colleges seriously interested in educating the
young must look elsewhere to find appropriate
teachers. 1
Schwehn raises, only to set aside, the crucial question of whether teachers can be taught to teach while
in graduate training. In a few places, he seems to
suggest that graduate schools could provide academics
who prided themselves on their teaching if only they
were prepared and encouraged to do so in the course
of their professional training. Perhaps this is so. But
whether such reform of graduate education--even if it
were accomplished--could go to the heart of "the conundrum of teaching and research" depends on a
prior and more fundamental question: What is "teaching"? Schwehn's failure to address this question
thematically is perhaps the most serious theoretical
weakness of the entire presentation.
In the course of trying to show that college teaching
has a dignity equal to that of original research,
1

St. John's College (Annapolis, MD, and Santa Fe, NM), perhaps
the American institution most serious about liberal education
and about teaching and learning communally, is absolutely indifferent to the graduate degrees or publishing record of its
prospective (and current) faculty.
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Schwehn assimilates the teacher to the researcher in
several ways, distinguishing them finally only by their
mode of "public-ation." He asserts that "all good
teachers are researchers" and that teaching, like publishing, is a form of public-ation of original research:
"All good teaching involves research and public-ation,
making public the best of one's own thoughts." Is this
true? Or, rather, of what view of teaching might this
be true?
If teaching means or is primarily the oral, orderly
presentation of some "subject matter"-be it information, concepts, evidence, methods, results of experiments, or reports of scholarly publications-then
Schwehn may be right. Such teachers, like researchers,
must keep up with their field or subject, arrange for
its orderly and convincing presentation, and make
public the best of their own thoughts on the subject.
A fount of knowledge, the professor 2 pours forth the
distillate of his own learning, presumably filling the
empty (but, it is to be hoped, open) student vessels
who are his public audience.

Teaching is not performance, display,
or the making public of a finished
product. Indeed, the activity may be
at its best when it goes unfinished.
The students. It is good to be reminded of them.
Not the graduate students, but that vast body of college youth whose initiation into adult life is somehow
connected with the life of the mind and the academic
vocation (such at least is the pretense of our colleges;
otherwise they might as well take their rite of passage
through gainful employment or in the armed forces,
and we professors might join research institutes or,
like the students, enter "the real world"). What if the
account of teaching begins not with the subject-matter
or academic discipline, but with our students-with
their needs, hopes, and possibilities? What if teaching
is not "delivering the goods" but rather providing the
occasion for the students' own learning, for awakening
and quickening the germs of wonder, interest, and
thoughtful and appreciative understanding of the various matters that can attract the human mind? What if
liberal education were defined not as the transmission
of accumulated knowledge, culture (or tradition), or
2

Jacob Klein , in translating the Greek term sophisti!s in the
Platonic dialogues, often rendered it as "professor" (rather than
"sophist"), one who professes his wisdom in public speeches.
See his marvelous A Commentary on Plato's Meno (University of
North Carolina Press) for a profound exploration of the subjects of teaching and learning.
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so-called "skills" of the mind, but as the thoughtful
search for understanding of the world and of ourselves within it, conducted by means of serious questioning and the careful study of the writings of other
and better inquirers? Teaching, under this view of
education, no longer looks like a different version of
research and public-ation.
Such a teacher will, of course, study hard and think
"for himself' (all real thinking is one's own work), but
he is not seeking an original contribution of hitherto
undiscovered knowledge. Though a devoted studenthe may even believe in some cases that "the fate of his
soul" is connected with his inquiry-he is not engaged
in wissenschaft, literally, the making or production
or creation of (new) knowledge. 3 Rather, he is seeking
insight and understanding, often by means of trying to
understand the work and thought of another; the
quest for originality and novelty is, to say the least, an
insignificant matter here-indeed, it is a positive hindrance.
Thus, though teaching for such a teacher is a public
activity, it is not an act of public-ation, and especially
not an act of publicizing his own best thoughts. In
some respects more public than original scientific research, such teaching is a public activity because it comprises open, common, and shared inquiry-at its best,
with students and teachers inquiring together. It is not
performance, display, or the making public of a
finished product. Indeed, the activity is often at its best
when it goes unfinished: questions publicly asked elicit
answers tentatively given, which when publicly
scrutinized turn out to be ill-conceived for reasons that
are themselves quite clear. Socrates, the master of such
obstetrical teaching, always insisted that he had no
teaching, only a way of life. According to the Platonic
dialogues, most of his fellow Athenians did not believe
him and treated him as just another professor
(sophistes); they understood his kind of teaching no better than do contemporary academics, who, by the way,
would never hire him as their colleague-and not only
because he did not publish.
This judgment of Socrates shows us one reason,
among others, why teaching understood in this way3

Schwehn's translation of wissenschaft as "academics" is, though
properly defended, unfortunate in that one loses thereby the
crucial etymological clue that the Weberian vocation-and view
of science-is one of "knowledge-production"-rather than , say
"discovery" or "reflection" or "contemplation" or "understanding." The crux of the present difficulties is that the vocation of
wissensciUJft, thus understood, has become the main vocation of
the academia (named for Plato's school of liberal learning) .
There is no reason why the main home of wissenschaft should
be the home also of liberal education of the young. (Consider,
for example, the National Institutes of Health , Bell
Laboratories, Air Soul's College at Oxford , the Institut Pasteur
in Paris, and the various Max Planck Institutes in German y.)
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as nurturing the will and ability to learn, to question,
and to become thoughtful about important matters-is
recalcitrant to the kind of public evaluation by peers
that Schwehn endorses: Who are such a teacher's
peers? But there are difficulties also with the matter to
be judged. Course syllabi, reading lists, and exams can
be evaluated, to be sure, as can the clarity and distinctness of lecture presentations. In some forms of teaching, where lecturing may be not only unavoidable but
positively desirable on pedagogic grounds, such measures of teaching excellence may be sufficient. But how
does one publicly measure what is stirring in the
minds and hearts of students-above and beyond their
memories, with their (probably only short-lived) recall
of material "transmitted"? Though the activity of
teaching and learning may proceed in full view, the
most important goings-on are often invisible and inarticulate, even for the participants themselves. Any
teacher worthy of the name knows how hard it is to
find out what is truly going on in the various souls
seated around his table. How, then , are a bunch of
outside evaluators, invited in for a few days, going to
judge the long-term or even short-term consequences
of a good conversation or even a stray question, especially when master teachers have trouble doing so with
their own students?
Here, by the way, we have stumbled on an area of
genuine research for genuine teachers: how to help
young people learn-and also what and when and
why. In fact, when my own institution, during the
Hutchins College era, had a separate College faculty,
devoted only to the collaborative teaching of undergraduates, their appointment to the faculty of this
center of research scholarship was frequently justified
in this way: they, too, did research, into the content
and the ways and means of a good liberal education.
No university I know of today continues this idea or
practice.
Now I suspect (from knowing him as a friend and
colleague, and from knowing his involvement in Christ
College) that Mark Schwehn is much friendlier to the
Socratic sort of teaching than the earlier part of his
paper would suggest. Indeed, toward the end of the
second installment, he endorses-at least for the Christian university-a living concern with tradition, expressed as "an ongoing conversation between the present and its own past." His final formulation: "To
make the tradition our own in order to keep it alive
for our students: this is the academic vocation." 4
Schwehn urges us not only to think about but also to
think with (by which, I take it, he means "with the aid
4

Can this view of our vocation be squared with his earlier formulation, publicizing "the best of one's own thoughts"?
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of') the great authors of the past, and to consider not
only what they are saying but also whether they speak
truly and centrally. 5
But here a different difficulty arises, which I can
only begin to discuss: How does this quest for what is
true and important, here and now, fit with the view of
teaching and learning as transmission of tradition?
Schwehn recognizes this difficulty, I believe, in distinguishing between traditionalism and tradition. If old
texts are treated as authorities, they cease to be instruments for genuine inquiry; authoritative opinion, however good, is inimical to thinking and learning insofar
as its authority rests on anything other than evidence
of and for its rightness. Yet if what is called tradition
is in no way authoritative, then it ceases to be tradition, that which is handed over as heritage. 6
Part of the difficulty may be that Schwehn takes up
his opposition to "Weberianism" in defense of the
Christian tradition and the Christian university.
Against the arch-enemy of rationalism-in-the-serviceof-mastery (which he calls, in the Christian manner,
"diabolical"), Schwehn counterposes what "Christians
know, by virtue of who they are and especially by virtue of the Biblical stories that both form and inform
them." Here, if not exactly to authority, Schwehn appeals to authoritative belief as the basis for knowledge.
This may be good enough for Christian universities.
But the academy at large will be unmoved, for it will
see this as external criticism of the sort that enlightenment thought has always rejected.
It will not do, therefore, to counter Weberianism
only by resorting to tradition . An internal and
philosophical critique is required-and possible. One
may begin by exposing the shrunken notion of mastery that Weber (and, before him, Descartes and
Bacon) embrace: How can one even pretend to be a
master without knowledge of ends and "goods" or without self-knowledge and self-mastery? One must take
up again the philosophical challenge to the views of
reason as a mere instrument of calculation, of knowledge as mere human creation in the service of mastery, of wissenschaft as the only dignified work of mind,
and of the impossibility of reasoning well about better
and worse. This challenge was begun long ago by Socrates, who noticed that the scientists and professors of
his day (and, we might add, of all other days), in their
quest for clarity and the resolution of perplexity, dis5

Here we are in full agreement. My questions to my students
are: What does the text say (and mean)? Why does the author
say it? Is it true? What difference does it make (or "So what?")?
6
For a full discussion of this paradox of "tradition," see Chapter
Two of Eva T. H. Brann's Paradoxes of Education in a Republic
(University of Chicago Press, 1979), the best book I know of on
the subject of American education .
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played an inadequate and rather thoughtless relation
to their own hypotheses or starting points. 7 They too
preferred problem-solving to questioning, the technical to the ordinary, the abstract and partial to the concrete and complete, the how to the whether and why.
But the Socratic challenge to the pretensions of demonstrative and calculating reason is conducted not by
appeals to the limits of reason or to some ancestral beliefs or texts, but by tenacious and thoughtful inquiry
into all opinions and notions, over the whole of being.
This pursuit of wisdom-passionate yet reasonable,
thoughtful yet precise, disciplined yet free-is the
more universal alternative to the Weberian spirit. Here
and there, even at Harvard and Stanford, its light is
flickering. But only where it flourishes can liberal education thrive; and only there can teaching acquire its
true dignity and honor.
Leon R. Kass, trained as a physician and biochemist, is
presently Henry R. Luce Professor of the Liberal Arts of
Human Biology in the College and the Committee on Social
Thought at the University of Chicago. He is also chairman
of a new undergraduate program, "Fundamentals: Issues
and Texts," in which students concentrate on important basic
questions by means of the intensive study of a few selected
classic texts. He has taught at St. John's College and is the
author of Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and
Human Affairs (The Free Press, 1985).
~~

Jonathan Z. Smith
In "Academics as a Vocation," Mark R. Schwehn has
raised a number of important issues confronting the
enterprise of higher education, including the "conundrum of teaching and research."' This aporia
plagues the profession, especially since the Sixties
when the Ph.D. became the all but universal (and, in
its present form, utterly inappropriate) credential for
college teaching. At one level, Schwehn is able to state
the issue succinctly: how can the faculty be "honored,
not scorned" for a career largely, or exclusively, devoted to teaching? The proposed solution, a social contract of "self-selection," recognizes the dilemma at the
cost of institutionalizing it. The proposal is an ingenious thought experiment to provoke reflection on the
consequences of our present modes of behavior. As a
practical solution, it is a conservative remedy to a radical situation.
I find far more promise in thinking about two issues
which Schwehn briefly raises and sets aside: graduate
education and the professional, collegial review of
teaching. Given his diagnosis, one cannot merely _con7

See, e.g., Plato, Republic 51 Oc ff. See also Meno and Theaetetus.
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cede the "socializing power of our graduate schools,"
nor be content with "leaving aside the very important
question of whether or not any teacher-training program could be successful at the graduate level." Given
his concern for parity, the sketch Schwehn presents of
a process of serious peer-review of teaching must not
be impeached as "verging on utopian fantasies." Both
strike at the root of the problem.
There has been much self-congratulatory talk lately
among colleges about reforming high school education
by imposing stricter requirements for college admission. While some of the rhetoric is unfortunate, such
proposals do recognize a very real relationship of
power. It is now time for colleges to "pick on someone
their own size," and take on, in a similar fashion, the
graduate establishment. After all, colleges are almost
the sole consumers of the products of graduate education, but their needs have been largely ignored. It is
far from clear that graduate programs hold themselves
accountable to anyone beside themselves-perhaps to
some vague notion of their wider professional associations, certainly neither to their particular educational
institutions, nor to the profession of education.
Colleges have the power to insist on accountability.
Let the deans of ten prestigious liberal arts colleges
produce an open letter to their graduate counterparts
detailing the reasons that they find their graduates incompetent to teach college students and suggesting
that they will no longer hire their products, and, at the
very least, discussion will ensue. There is no principled
reason why graduate education cannot provide as
much explicit training in matters of pedagogy as it
now provides in matters of research. It is long overdue
that the rhetoric that "teaching is an art" be questioned. Perhaps it is true at the outer margins of excellence (as true as it is for research), but teaching is,
above all, a skilled profession which can be trained for
in ways analogous to present training for research. As
I have written elsewhere:
The fact remains that, despite much talk about the relationship of teaching to research, the recognition that the majority
of positions in the future will be in undergraduate programs,
and the widespread employment of graduate students in instructional roles, there is little explicit attention to teaching in
most graduate programs. What occurs, with heroic exceptions, seems to take place largely by accident or as a result of
an uncommon, and ultimately countereducational, faith in
imitation and trial and error. I would think that it would be
possible to design teaching requirements as a part of the
Ph.D.-at the very least, to require the submission of a proposed syllabus for a course of the student's design with a
written rationale for the various elements and pedagogic

1

Schwehn's point is more subtle than is suggested by the subtitle
on the cover of issue in which his article appeared: "The
Academic Life: Teaching vs. Research ?"
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strategies, or the preparation of a series of critical reviews of
the major undergraduate textbooks in one's field of interest,
with the development of seminars or colloquia in support of
these. Such requirements, alongside the more usual modes of
inservice training, especially if the latter included analyzing
the pedagogics and performance of a course as well as its
subject matter, would be a modest beginning. I would hope
for a time when it would be as routine a matter to deny a
degree to a student who failed the teaching requirement as
it would to one who failed some linguistic or special-area
examination.2
Indeed, one might go further and question whether
the traditional, monographic dissertation ought to be
the sole mode of testing for the conferring of a doctoral degree, whether there might be alternative
means for rigorous evaluation which better reflect the
kinds of tasks scholars and teachers perform in the
present academy. 3
I have raised the question of graduate training in
teaching at the outset because, without it, Schwehn's
Modest Proposal of "self-selection" appears empty. I
applaud his insistence on processes of peer-review and
his eloquent argument against the notion that teaching
is a private act. But what guarantees the criteria used
for evaluating excellence? As long as the presupposition is that teaching is a mysterious process, an art, will
not such evaluative processes always bear the stigma of
being mere opinion, or the charitable recognition of
sheer good will?
Colleges must undertake required programs in continuing education on pedagogical matters for their faculty. Training in teaching does not end (if it ever
began) with the conferring of the graduate degree.
Teachers have as solemn an obligation to "keep up"
with the literature and research in education and
learning as they do in their particular fields of research-and they should be funded accordingly.
Bluntly put, for example, no one should be permitted
to teach an introductory course who is not conversant,
among other matters, with the literature on the cognitive development of individuals of college age, with issues of critical reasoning and informal logic, and with
techniques of writing instruction. It is not sufficient to
be a Mr. Chips. That is to say, there can be parity between the teaching and research aspects of the profession, but the price of such parity is seriousness and
work. We have allowed all the rigor as well as the concomitant advantages to accrue to the research side. We
must learn to be as professional with respect to the
2
J. Z. Smith, "Here and Now: Prospects for Graduate Education ," in J. Neusner, ed., New Humanities and Academic Disciplines: The Case of jewish Studies (University of Wisconsin Press:
Madison, 1984), 37-8. See further the section on "The Profession of College Teaching" in the AAC Report, Integrity in the
College Curriculum (Association of American Colleges:
Washington, D.C., 1985), 35-9.
3
For one suggestion, see Smith, 44-5, n.2.
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one as to the other.
While I applaud Schwehn's "fantasy" of more rigorous and intellectually stimulating processes of peer-review, it is only one step, one confined to individual institutions. What is required is a national, professional
establishment for college teaching parallel to the professional establishment for research. Lacking this, we
give comfort to the canard that research is somehow
capable of objective and public evaluation (the point of
publication), while the evaluation of teaching remains
merely subjective. One might imagine the most obvious components of such a parallel establishment, elements that would fill the teaching side of an individual's dossier to the degree that the research side is
presently filled. Only by such provisions will the teaching enterprise be "honored, not scorned."
One might imagine a genuine professional association which has college-level teaching as its primary
concern. We are presently ill-served by the educational
associations which largely cater to administrative concerns and lobbying efforts, or by the quasi-union activities of other groups. Neither is capable of commanding intellectual respect. As a beginning, one
might suggest the establishment of an invitational network (Pugwash-style) of concerned and competent individuals who would undertake to meet regularly each
summer for a week on pedagogical and curricular
matters. 4 Most teachers lack any sense of colleagues
beyond their institutions. Two or three-day workshops,
while providing a needed "high," quickly fade away
with little tangible results. Individuals devoted to college teaching need to find the same sense of corporate
identity and stimulation with respect to their educational concerns as they now are able to find in the annual meetings of professional societies with respect to
their research interests.
There needs to be a national, refereed journal devoted to college pedagogy in which both the results of
research in the various fields of knowledge relevant to
teaching might be conveyed, and in which faculty
might publish thoughtful articles on curricular and instructional experiments. There are a few models in
specific fields, but nothing which addresses the profession as a whole.
Perhaps the greatest single scandal is the relative
lack of competent reviews of college textbooks in the
professional journals of the learned societies. This
leads, among other consequences, to the anti-educational position of some institutions that textbooks will
not be considered in making tenure decisions. A single
4

The rudiments of such a network were in place in the Danforth
Program. The decision by the Foundation's trustees to tenninate this enterprise was one of the more irresponsible moments
in the history of private support for higher education.
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organ for such reviews, whether as a part of the proposed journal or as a free-standing entity, which focuses not only on matters of content but on pedagogical strategy and effectiveness would go far to confer
status on this central educational activity.
Finally, we need to spend as much energy and dollars crafting criteria and mechanisms for peer-review
of teaching competence as we have spent creating national systems for the peer-evaluation of research proposals. There needs to be the presumption of trained
expertise in such matters-not merely a collection of
anecdotes (from students and colleagues) or the exercise of show-and-tell.
It is my presumption that each of these activities
(and others that will rapidly be thought of) will receive
the same sort of respect and financial support that is
presently granted to a narrow understanding of research. That, in fact, it will be understood that all faculty must be expected to engage in research, whether
in a discipline or in disciplined and sustained public
thought about curriculum and pedagogy. Too much
has been made in discourse about such matters of the
reward system. It is not from Sinai. We have created
the present inbalance, we cannot blame it on local
boards or on the Federal government. If we don't like
it, we can change it. There are no impediments
beyond our own will.
Jonathan Z. Smith is the Robert 0. Anderson Distinguished
Service Professo1· of the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He served as Dean of the College from 1977-82 and
on the Commission on the Baccalaureate Degree of the Association of American Colleges which recently issued its report, Integrity in the College Curriculum. H is most recent book is Imagining Religion : From Babylon to

Jonestown (19 82).
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Richard Jungkuntz
What is Mark Schwehn's real question?
ls it the "conundrum of teaching and [vs.] research"?
Is it "how can faculty members extract more research subsidy from niggardly institutions?"
Is it "how can we stem the tide of intellectualization in order to recover an 'enchanted world,' "
or "... in order to recover a sense of Christian
identity?"
Is it "how can academicians gain a common and
true sense of vocation?"
Depending on what paragraphs in Schwehn's twopart essay one happens to be reading, the question he
wants to address might be any of the above, or
perhaps all. That makes it rather difficult to respond
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with brevity and point. (As Harvey Cox once quipped
to a critic who complained that Dr. Cox's second book
was inconsistent with the first: "Hard to hit a moving
target, isn't it?")
Nevertheless, Schwehn's essay does merit a serious
and considered response, because the question(s) he
raises is/are troublesome indeed for higher education
generally and for church-related institutions in particular. In what follows I shall for brevity's sake say far
less about what I found valuable in the essay than
about some of the premises and lines of argument that
seem to me somewhat lacking in validity.
For my text I take Mark 12 :30 (cf. also Mt. 22:37;
Lk. 10:27): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . .
with all thy mind."
In Schwehn's various descriptions of the "problem"
I sense some vestigial remnant of the traditional
catechumenate in American Lutheranism with its typical emphasis on the Reformer's familiar warnings
against Dame Reason as Aristotle's "whore." Not that
Schwehn is unaware of the dangers in anti-intellectualism. But he leaves the reader with a feeling that
the essayist bears a sense of uneasiness whenever rationality, or the intellect as such, seems to occupy
center stage in academe.
That uneasiness, however, is not reflective of a
genuinely Lutheran perspective on the role and means
of higher education. On the contrary, the Lutheran
tradition at its best-like Luther himself-accords to
human reason per se unqualified recognition as one of
the Creator's noblest and highest gifts.
To return briefly to our text: loving the God of the
Gospel with one's "mind" is in itself a response that
springs from faith and without risk to faith. And what
the "mind" (reason, intellect) does in the loving of God
is to "calculate," that is, to employ all the canons and
processes of logical rationality in striving to learn
whatever there is to be learned about "reality" in all of
God's creation.
To fail, or fear, to employ one's reason in this way
is to be ungrateful to God; it is the failure of the unfaithful servant who buried his talent in the ground
because he feared the master's anger on his return
[Mt. 25:14-30].
What I'm trying to say here is that under the Gospel
we should feel free, and in fact are free, to acknowledge gladly that Weber was entirely right in saying
that "in principle we can master all things by calculation."
Note Weber's careful qualifying phrase, "in principle." Note also that the expression "all things" is not
the same as "all things in heaven as well as on earth."
Since Weber, in Schwehn's view as well as mine, was
certainly no fool, it seems clear that what he had in
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mind with the expression "all things" was not "all
things whatsoever," but rather "all things that are intrinsically susceptible of calculation."
For, as Schwehn himself readily acknowledges,
Weber was addressing a particularly vexing problem
of his time (and perhaps of every time in human history), namely, that even the "educated" were all too
easily inclined to deal with worldly realities as if theyand the world itself-were in subjection to "enchantment," and hence irrationally controlled by magic, necromancy, or whatever, rather than by "natural" cause
and effect, namely, by what Lutheran theologians have
sometimes called the "semiorders of creation."
What these preliminary observations all lead up to
is, of course, the well-known, though all too often misunderstood, dialectic best expressed in Luther's "two
kingdoms" metaphor, or the metaphor of God's "right
hand and left hand." 1
Stated all too briefly, God's working through "grace"
(the force-less act of forgiving) and His working
through "law" (the force-filled threat of pain and
promise of gain) are the two-and only two-modes of
divine regnancy. Each mode is divine and good; each
is effective in its own way and for its own purpose; but
only grace is salvific, and only law controls a fallen humanity this side of the consummation. The unbeliever
remains always, though unwittingly, under the regnancy of "law," while the Christian is simultaneously
under the regnancy of both "law" and "grace." "Law"
is not something to be believed; it is simply experienced and experienced by every human being born
into the world. "Grace" elicits and addresses faith.
Where faith is absent, "law" elicits fear and the selfish
calculus of advantage versus disadvantage. But where
faith is present, the gift of human reason is freed up
to do its proper "calculation" in regard to all of God's
creation.
But what is the relevance of this for the questions
that Schwehn raises? He concludes his essay: "What
then is the academic vocation? ... To make the tradition our own in order to keep it alive for our students: this is the academic vocation." No, it is not!
Tradition does not need academic professionals to
keep it alive. Long before Homer (or someone else
with the same name) ever set the Iliad tales into dactylic hexameters, those tales and the tradition they
conveyed were kept alive by generations of illiterate
1

Space does not permit much elucidation of these fundamental
and characteristically Lutheran perceptions. The reader to
whom these concepts are novel is encouraged to consult B. A.
Gerrish's excellent book, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther; or (for an abbreviated explanation) the present
writer's article on "The Church's Responsibility in International
Affairs" in the Concordia Theological Monthly (March, 1970).
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people for whom the notion of "academy"-if indeed
they'd ever heard the word-had no reference except
perhaps as a plot of ground sacred to the memory of
the hero Hecademus.
That the academic vocation deals with traditionamong many other things-is not to be denied. But
dealing with tradition is not what makes the academic
profession a vocation (beruj). Rather, for a Christian
faculty member the academic vocation (as "calling") is
to love the God of the Gospel with the mind. To employ one's mind, intellect, and reason for the continual, unflagging, loving inquiry into the created
works of God-that is our academic vocation.
And love is a passion! Which means that Weber was
essentially right-wittingly or not-in his description of
"this strange intoxication" that prompts a genuine
academician to feel as if "the fate of his soul depends
upon whether or not he makes the correct conjecture
Moreover, like all impassioned love, this "vocational"
love cannot be silent about itself, cannot hide itself,
but finds itself needing to be proclaimed, shared, professed! Which ought to be-as Weber implies-the
only reason anyone would ever want to become a
"professor."
To me this understanding of academics as vocation
also provides more satisfying answers to Schwehn's
other questions than the pragmatic compromises he
suggests.
Schwehn expresses concern about how we might
stem the tide of intellectualization in order to recover
an "enchanted world." Or, how we might recover a
sense of "Christian identity" in the face of intellectualization.
The answers are, I think, evident. For those who
love God, intellectualization is no threat. On the contrary, it is a divinely encouraged means of loving God.
Hence, it ought to be recognized as one of the marks
of a college's Christian identity. Or should Christian
academicians revert to sorcery, thaumaturgy, witchcraft, and magic (or their contemporary equivalents) in
order to avoid Weber's clearsighted "disenchantment
of the world"?
Another of Schwehn's suggestions entails faculty
self-selection into either the non-publishing cadre or
the "publish or perish" cohort, with the latter to be relieved of some "course-load" and committee assignments, while the former are assigned additional teaching responsibilities. Regarding this astonishing contra
naturam proposal I can only point out that merely assuring a second-class citizen that she/he is really not
second-class (in the administrative mind) does nothing
whatever to alter his/her de facto second-class citizenship. Of this it seems apropos to quote Schwehn quot11

ing Charcot: "La theorie, c'est bon, mais
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The related suggestion that "public-ation" of course
descriptions, syllabi, and reading lists might serve as
surrogates for "publishing" will not be taken seriously
by any self-respecting academician in my acquaintance.
Course descriptions are patently innocuous invitations
to register. Syllabi reflect (at most) the teacher's unsupported claim that what needs to be learned can in
fact be learned within the framework of x units spread
over y weeks of the term. And reading lists that lack
scrupulously accurate and astutely perceptive annotations ought to be forbidden altogether.
On the other hand, I readily and appreciatively
grant that a carefully prepared academic paper, presented to and discussed by colleagues in the department, division, or school, may well be more significant
evidence of a faculty member's scholarly competence
than many an article that finds its way into print in
some professional journal whose contents are seldom
if ever discussed, much less disputed.
What this leads me to observe is that evidence of
continuing scholarly growth (in whatever form that evidence may be seen) is a far more important and valuable measure of a faculty member's devotion to the
calling than the publication of so-called research findings.
It has all too long been a fundamental American
error to equate wissenschaft with what we call "science"; to equate "science," in turn, with "research";
and finally to make "research"-thus understood-the
ultimate yardstick for measuring a scholar's stature in
any discipline whatever. But what Weber and all his
German colleagues understood by wissenschaft was simply "scholarship," with or without "research." And
scholarship is simply the activity of a rigorously inquiring human mind, the kind of mind that is continually
asking three question: Really? Why? What for?-the
questions of fact, cause, and purpose.
o modern scientist would grant that what a classical scholar is engaged in while poring over an ancient text and staking his "soul" on a rational conjecture as to its meaning is in any real sense an act of research. It cannot be research because it is utterly and
forever non-replicable and hence incapable of being
"scientifically tested." But neither would an intelligent
scientist derogate that classical scholar's activity as not
worthy of an academician. It is, rather, highly worthy
of the academician's true calling because it is the passionate application of a human mind (intellect) to the
task of understanding something that is ultimately as
much a part of God's creative handiwork as is the
gene or the atom.
For an academician to be able truthfully to tell his
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or her undergraduate students, "I have thought long
and hard about this, and I have reflected honestly on
every reasonable interpretation, and I can only conclude ... "-that, in my view, is an admirable way of
fulfilling the academic vocation.
And I am genuinely grateful to my friend, Mark
Schwehn, for obliging me to think seriously and
explicitly about the "conundrum" he has so provocatively posed.
Richard Jungkuntz is Provost of Pacific Lutheran University. A classicist by training, he taught at Northwestern College, Concordia Seminary (Springfield), and Eden Seminary
before coming to PLU. H e also served from 1965-70 as
Executive Secretary of the Commission on Theology of the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. His articles have appeared
in a number of journals and his books include The Gospel
of Baptism (1968).
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Richard John Neuhaus
Karl Kraus, that prolific Viennese writer at the turn
of the century, was once asked by a student, "Herr
Professor Kraus, why do you write books?" He is supposed to have answered, "Because, young man , I have
not character enough not to." That is not the whole
story about the itch to publish, but I suspect it is an
important part of it.
When I was about nine years old I came across one
of these gelatin mixtures you put into a baking pan .
I think it was called hectographing, but older readers
will know what I mean. By rubbing sheets of paper
against the impression on the gelatin one could produce about thirty copies, which was just right for the
circulation of a really first-class neighborhood newspaper for Miller Street in Pembroke, Ontario. So you
can see that from early on my lack of character was
such that I assumed people would be, or should be, interested in what I had to say. There was recently an
item in the New York Times indicating that an alarming
percentage of today's writers started out as children
producing neighborhood newspapers. Parents should
take note. By nipping the habit in the bud they are
perhaps in the best position to alleviate the glut of
writing which is presently smothering what remains of
Western civilization.
Because nobody caught me in time-and some
adults who should have known better actually encouraged me-it has been downhill from the Miller Street
Gazette. During a brief stay at Concordia High School
in Seward, Nebraska, I wrote for the student paper.
(Dr. Alfred Fuerbringer, then president, had the good
judgment to advise me that my career probably lay
elsewhere than at Concordia, so I never did finish
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high school, which possibly makes me the only high
school dropout in the Lutheran ministerium .) I remember doing a piece that particularly excited me on
the operation of Concordia's cafeteria. Tough investigative reporting turned up, among other things, the
fact that something like 700 loaves of bread were
baked there each week. It was not that anyone was trying to conceal the fact, but neither was anyone paying
much attention to it, and I thought they should .
But it was later, as an editor of The Seminarian at
Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, that the vice was exercised on weightier matters. Like the chronology of
Genesis, the historicity of the Resurrection, and why it
was all right to pray with Roman Catholics. We're talking about the late Fifties when Missouri was churning
with controversies beyond numbering. The Seminarian
was the favored foil of the seminary's conservative critics. The administration pooh-poohed our literary excursions into heresy (meaning anything beyond the
boundaries of Francis Pieper and synodical resolutions), pointing out that kids will be kids. But the critics knew better. If you don't stop them now these kids
might later write books that at least some innocent
readers would take seriously. What the critics didn't
know is that it was already about fifteen years too late.
"Train a child in the way he should go . . ."
Later-twelve books, hundreds of articles, innumerable newsletters and reviews later-the toll taken on
the minds and the patience of readers would be immeasurable. Karl Kraus' answer to the student was, I
believe, astute. I am frequently asked by young people
who take me to be a writer how one becomes a writer.
As though it were similar to becoming a gynecologist
or academic dean. My impulse, seldon restrained , is to
say that if you aren't a writer already don 't bother. A
writer writes and writes and then writes some more,
and then some day some people may take him to be
a writer. And if he is never publicly recognized, he
must then decide whether he will write as a solitary
vice. I do not say that writers are born not made , but,
if not born, they are at least bent at an early age.
There is the opinion that a prerequisite to becoming
a writer is to believe that you have something to say.
Meaning no offense to the fools who subscribe to that
opinion, I think it quite wrong. I would not know that
I have something to say were it not for the things
being said by others which should not be said, or
which are in urgent need of correction. I do wait a decent interval for someone else to do the correcting, but
if that is not forthcoming I, with typewriter and a little
time at hand, do my duty. I know an eminent and
much-published writer who claims that he has never
written anything except he was asked to write it by
someone else. Such laissez-faire devotion to the market
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of ideas is striking but quite beyond my ken. To the
best of my recollection, nobody asked for the Miller
Street Gazette. I do not intend to suggest that all my
writing is reactive, provoked by the silly things written
by others, which it is my obligation to set straight. This
very piece, like many others, is at the invitation of an
editor (which he may be coming to regret). Then, too,
you cannot be forever correcting arguments that other
people got all wrong without somebody challenging
you to make the argument the way it should be made.
From the imprudence of responding to that challenge
come books and, as Blessed Martin Luther might have
said, other great shame and vice. And surely he
should know.
Mark Schwehn's otherwise excellent essay is altogether too solemn about the purpose of publication,
beginning with the assumption that publication always
has a purpose. I am sure these assistant professors he
discusses-hungry for status or eager to advance their
discipline, or both-actually exist. But my hunch is
that publication is more commonly prompted by what
I suspect prompted Mr. Schwehn's fine essay: Dammit,
here's a dumb situation about which people are saying
dumb things and I think I'll try my hand at straightening it out. Anyway, Mr. Schwehn probably said to himself, I really do like to write. The clincher likely was
that Editor Nuechterlein had the good sense to encourage him to act on his impulse. I rather doubt that
Mr. Schwehn thought that with this essay he was
either advancing his career or, in the manner of Max
Weber, making some contribution to learning that will
one day be vindicated in the consummation of human
knowledge. Although, so admirable is the essay that I
would not be surprised if it did both.
Mr. Schwehn is exactly right when he talks about
publication as continuing the conversation. Over the
years I have been book editor for several journals. I
recall one bright afternoon talking with a visitor at my
office on East 64th Street, surrounded by piles of the
several hundred books received that month. And what
are you doing now? she asked. Well, I'm working on
this book about .. . And then I stopped, struck by the
improbability of the world really needing another
book. When it comes to the making of books the
writer of Ecclesiastes didn't know the half of it. Last
year there were over 55,000 trade books published in
the United States alone. That does not include purely
scholarly publications, nor at least as many books put
out by corporations, institutes, sundry voluntary associations, and government agencies. Even if he sticks to
his own field, anyone who is "on top of the literature"
today is probably perched on a very high stack of unread books. A serious book today-which is to say any
book that requires what used to be a 12th grade level

13

of literacy-does well to sell 3,000 copies and is a best
seller at 15,000. Beyond that it is a sensation.
It might all be very depressing, were it not for the
truth of what Mr. Schwehn says about the continuing
conversation. Rather, the many continuing conversations, the most important of which, many of us think,
is that of the community of reflective Christian faith.
In publishing, and I daresay in teaching, it helps if
one is at least in part a preacher. The preacher has no
illusions about the novelty of what he has to say. Not
novelty but fidelity is his concern. Although, to be
sure, he tries to transmit the faith in ways that are
fresh, if not new. Nor does he have any illusions about
being able to demonstrate the effectivene&s of his efforts. A long time ago I thought that the biblical
promise about the word not returning void was the
consolation of incompetent preachers. Twenty-five
years later I know better, or maybe I just know that
we incompetents can't get along without our consolations. So also in publishing, you do not know what effect your words may have, or even who are all the
partners in the conversation.
A friend of mine announced upon sending another
scholarly work of anthropology off to the publisher,
"It is like dropping a very beautiful rose petal down
a very deep well, never to be heard from again."
Another friend, a philosopher, is confident of the
place of his work in the history of ideas. No future laborer in the philosophical vineyard, he believes, will be
able to go around what he has contributed to the conversation. Because this ~riend is a genius of monumental stature, I am not inclined to argue. But most of us
are probably somewhere between the deep-well theory
and being sure about our place in the world-historical
scheme of things. And some people appear to have
given up thinking about it and just publish to be publishing. One writer of my acquaintance published so
many books and articles that it was said he had no unpublished thoughts. Then he, a presumably celibate
priest, published a torrid book on human sexuality,
after which it was said he had no unpublished fantasies. Such proliferous abandonment of restraint
suggests a paraphrase of that ugly sentiment espoused
by some soldiers of fortune: Publish them all and let
God sort them out.
But that is not the kind of conversation Mr.
Schwelm has in mind. His conversation has to do with
discrete traditions and is closer to what Mr. Pelikan
describes in that elegant book to which Mr. Schwehn
alludes. Mr. Pelikan writes about the "florilegium."
The florilegium was the product of Eastern Orthodox
scribes who wrote history by stringing together quotations from earlier writers. The originality of the
florilegium was not in anything that was said directly
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but in the originality of the way the tradition was arranged. Mr. Pelikan makes a convincing case that, far
from being stifling, this procedure is one of exquisite
creativity if we are but able to perceive it. Not incidentally, this aspect of his The Vindication of Tradition tells
us much about Mr. Pelikan's understanding of his own
work, for example his multi-volume The Christian Tradition. All of us who write should keep the idea of the
florilegium at least occasionally in mind. Otherwise we
are just pushing ourselves forward or, as they say, "expressing" ourselves. And that is not too different from
putting out the Miller Street Gazette. Which is okay
for kids .
Richard John Neuhaus is the Director of The Center on
Religion and Society in New York City. The most recent of
his many books is The Naked Public Square (1984). A
long-time leader in civil rights and peace issues, he was for
17 years pastor of a low-income Black and Hispanic parish
in Brooklyn, New York. H e also served for eight years as
Senior Editor of Worldview. H e is currently Editor of both
Lutheran Forum Letter and The Religion and Society
~~ .
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Martin E. Marty
Of course, Mark Schwehn is correct. When professors are forced to see, or choose to see, their "work"
chiefly as their individual writing, they will not see,
they will overlook, their calling to teach in the community called a college or a university. When they are
forced to write chiefly because of the pressures a
bureaucratized academic world places upon them , they
are likely to contribute to a market glutted with sterile,
unneeded, unread , unreadable productions. In sum,
they will pervert culture to something like Simone
Weil's depiction of it at its worst: professors teaching
people to be professors teaching people to be professors . . .. Or: people believing they must produce setting a standard for other people believing they must
produce setting a standard for ... , etc.
Rather than spend time and space merely affirming
and confirming Schwehn-and thus contr~buting to
academic sterility by publishing with nothing to say,
but merely under pressures of editorial cajoling and
deadlines-let me try to push the point he makes into
a context where it is no longer the only point to make.
I think it is important to ask a question of another vocation: that of the different kinds of institutions, parts
of institutions, and scholarly circles or scholars within
institutions. I would hate to see the impression given
that secular and state-supported universities and welloff pagan private colleges should be the places whence
comes the scholarship, dross and valuable alike, while
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the church-related college can satisfy itself with good
teaching scholars. (I never get the impression that
Schwehn wants a lower standard of scholar at the
entry level in the church-related or vocationally-alert
college, so let us keep calling these teachers "scholars."
They are not meant to be hacks, repeaters of last
year's notes and outlines, serving time.)
Just as individuals have vocations that antecede, underlie, and judge their professions, careers, jobs, or, in
Schwehn's term, "work," so do institutions and parts of
institutions. Thus Rockefeller University is called to be
nothing but a research university, chiefly in the sciences. It could fulfill its calling with a staff of inept
speakers, mumblers, chaotic absent-minded professors-so long as they are first-rate discoverers in the
laboratory. DeVry Tech could fulfill its calling if it had
nothing but very gifted and dedicated people who did
nothing but teach others to be good electronics engineers in the radio-television fields. Most schools are
somewhere between the pure-discovery type and the
pass-on-skills type. What I am stressing is that one
must discern the genius, character, what Aristotle
would call the ethos of a school. On those terms, to
ask the church-related college to define its calling in
Rockefeller or DeVry terms would be to miss the intentions and to neglect the vocation of such a college.
Similarly within a college there are a variety of callings. At a good school, people who sense this do not
demean or dismiss the others: hmmmm, a mere
teacher who never "produces work," or hmmmm, a
mere scholar who stutters in the classroom. No, various departments or types have various vocations which
are to be nurtured in complementarity toward common ends. I do believe, however, that where that combination exists and receives encouragement from constituency, students, and faculty members themselves,
the larger vocation of the church-related college will
become apparent.
That larger vocation, over all, must include Christians, religiously-called people, who in that context also
want to contribute to discovery. Not to keep that calling in mind for any of them would be to turn learning
and discovery over to non-Christians only, or to isolated Christians who are Robinson Crusoes producing
off there without stimulus or appraisal by their cobelievers. I have become an adviser to Faculty Dialogue,
a new journal of The Institute for Christian Leadership (write them: 9733 S.E. Frenchacres Drive, Portland , OR 97266), where issues of this sort get discussed and published-though, of course, never as
sterile monographs or because not to publish there
would be to perish.
At a recent board meeting, one adviser kept saying '
that we must encourage administrations to release reSeptember, 1985

straints against scholarly inquiry and to give encouragement to publishing scholars. Then there might be
a burst of creativity from these evangelical schools. A
dose of realism came in when another adviser asked:
are we sure there are that many people there trained
to discover, gifted with the art to write, able to say
what is not being said elsewhere? I do believe that
there are many more, but I also believe that Christianity will have a hard time having its voice heard if the
public deduces that our colleges and universities settle
for people who reproduce knowledge and filter it
through the glass of Christian greenhouses where students are protected from the unorthodoxies where adventure, and thus learning, occurs. Shouldn't some
Christians in some parts of some schools see that their
institutions have a vocation, as do they, to participate
in scholarly inquiry?
Such a sense will occur only if the act of seeking to
discover be perceived as itself occurring in a kind of
sacred zone, just as entering the presence of the Other
and the other[s] in the classroom is entering a kind of
sacred zone. If that context is created, it is likely that
more scholarship will come from Christian churchrelated or Christian collectivities within state-supported
or private secular universities.
Where I believe a line can be misdrawn, where
Schwehn can be misinterpreted, or where he misinterprets, is here: if it is assumed that all really good
teachers teach and eschew scholarly productivity because they have not time for both. Or if it is assumed
that all really productive scholars see and must see
that as their work and then have no time to devote to
teaching. That is not where the line is at institutions
where encouragement is given to both activities.
Through these thirty years I have spoken or conferred at over 500 American colleges and universities.
Give me a few days at most of them, and I could help
assemble a list of what Ortega would call the "culture
faculty." I translate his category to include in it that
one-fourth or one-third of almost any faculty that is
characterized by Marcel's disponsibilite, which means its
"being available" to administration, alumni, campus
visitors. These are the people who do not "use" a
school but who "are" a school. They have time or take
time or make time to honor colleagues who win prizes,
to greet some recitalists or campus lecturers, who do
not avoid parties for financial supporters, who risk interdisciplinary occasions.
Follow me to those campuses and after isolating that
one-fourth or one-third, track their names in the library and indices and you will find a far higher percentage of them indexed as being scholarly productive
than the faculty majority that was not there. Follow me
then to dorm or classroom and interview students to
15

find out which professors are their exemplars. The
percentage who are on that "available" list, who make
up the college, as it were, will be higher than the percentage of those on the invisibles list. It is not possible
to follow our two cohorts into their homes, nurseries,
bedrooms, and the like, but I do carry away an impression that they are also people who are not more
neglectful of family and friendship circle than are the
invisibles.
Once one dismisses the Weberian productivity
norms, then, I think the line should be drawn between
people who sense a "whole" vocation at institutions
whose vocation it is to encourage "whole" expression
and those who live life at a lower-key level of stimulus
and response. Colleagues turn each other on; they
allow students to excite and incite them; then, with
some institutional and constituent encouragement,
they produce. Their production is not, then, sterile
scholarly monographs published for publication's or
for non-perishing's sake. They will have risked in the
sacred zone where discovery occurs, on a horizon
where the Other beckons them to help dispel ignorance, to learn from the wonder that such a zone inspires. Do they hear this Other calling? If they respond: that is vocation.

ture.
Kass and Smith properly identify the central questions that need to be addressed after one has been
persuaded that teaching has lost its central place of
dignity and honor within the academy, that this loss is
a result of a Weberian understanding of the academic
vocation that has come to dominate contemporary university life, and that such a los is regrettable. What is
teaching? What is good teaching? Can teaching be
evaluated? Can teaching be taught? Kass elegantly articulates a view of teaching that I do indeed share with
him, but he seems doubtful about whether such teaching can be appraised through the kind of "public
evaluation by peers" that I have suggested . Smith does
not develop his own view of teaching, but he seems
certain that teaching must be subjected to rigorous
and elaborate peer review procedures if it is to become
"honored, not scorned."
I am persuaded not only by Kass' account of liberal
learning and teaching but also by his argument that
standard peer evaluation procedures will not work well
in such a context. On the other hand, I agree with
Smith: if we are serious about promoting excellence in
teaching, we must discover and invent responsible
ways of nurturing and evaluating it. Thus, I welcome

Martin E. Marty is Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service
Professor at The University of Chicago. In light of the above,
he is to be described as a superbly productive scholar of nonsterile monographs, a sensationally accomplished teacher, a
clinker of glasses at president's receptions, a devoted family
man, and in other ways a work-righteous achiever apparently
not in need of grace. (He is also, at least on occasion, the
author of his own biographical introductions.-Ed.)
Cl
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Keller on "The Question of the Ordination of
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payable to the Cresset and mail to:

Of the five respondents to my essay on the academic
vocation, Professors Kass, Smith, and Jungkuntz have
offered the most thoroughgoing critiques of my views,
and it is to their comments that these remarks are addressed. As it happens, Kass and Smith differ almost
completely with Jungkuntz. Thus, the two former writers agree with my critique of Max Weber, and they
therefore by and large share my understanding of the
nature of the problem that we presently face in the
academy. They think, however, that portions of my
analysis of the problem and/or my proposed remedies
for it are insufficiently radical. Jungkuntz, because he
apparently shares Weber's understand ing of the
academic vocation, thinks that my efforts to formulate
theoretical and practical alternatives to Weber are unnecessary and hence invariably misguided. At times,
he even asserts that my proposals are contrary to na16
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many of Smith's suggestions for fostering disciplined
thought about teaching, especially his notion that "colleges must undertake required programs in continuing
education on pedagogical matters for their faculty."
Though I also welcome many of Smith's more ambitious ideas, I still believe that the restoration of excellence in teaching must begin (here I disagree with both
Kass and Smith) locally within institutions that are
primarily devoted to undergraduate education. Thus,
my proposal to organize faculty meetings around the
critical discussion of teaching materials (reading lists,
syllabi, examination questions, etc.) is not intended, as
Jungkuntz thinks it is, to elevate the reading list to an
intellectual status equal to that of a specialized monograph. Rather, my hope would be that really thorough
and serious critical scrutiny of such materials would
lead quite naturally to the kinds of questions that Kass
poses as an agenda for "genuine research for genuine
teachers: how to help young people learn-and also
what and when and why."
Within the context of a genuine community of
teachers "devoted only (or at least primarily) to the collaborative teaching of undergraduates," some of the
evaluative procedures that Smith recommends and
others that Kass might, I think, accept would develop
quite naturally. I recall, for example, that the fruits of
the research into "the ways and means of liberal education" that was once undertaken at the University of
Chicago in large part sustained the high quality of the
journal of General Education during the Hutchins era.
And in the midst of a continuing community conversation about liberal learning, teachers would regularly
teach one another as well as students. In such an environment the kinds of mechanical and sporadic teaching-review procedures that Kass rightly questions
would be both irrelevant and unnecessary.
Interest in and devotion to any of the proposals outlined by Kass, Smith, or me presuppose a conviction
that the present understanding of the academic vocation needs redefinition and reconstruction. Both Kass
and Jungkuntz question my formulation of the
academic vocation as the transmission of tradition.
Kass agrees with me that Weberianism is to be opposed. But he argues that a philosophical critique is to
be preferred to one that resorts to tradition.
Jungkuntz supports Weberianism ; therefore, he opposes my definition of the academic vocation just as he
would presumably oppose any other alternative formulation. Or, more exactly, Jungkuntz perceives no
conflict at all between his definition of the academic
vocation ("To employ one's mind , intellect, and reason
for the continual, unflagging, loving inquiry into the
created works of God") and Weber's. He therefore has
difficulty understanding what my problem is, and , mSeptember, 1985

sofar as he does understand it, he denies that it is a
genuine problem.
Kass has not yet fully persuaded me to abandon my
emphasis upon the centrality of tradition in favor of
a more philosophical critique of Weberianism. I would
argue that the kind of liberal learning that he and I
espouse is supported by and perhaps even dependent
upon tradition (though liberal learning conflicts with
traditionalism, as we both recognize). Liberal learning
does not begin de novo. Inquiry begins with opinions,
and the best inquiry begins with an examination of the
best thoughts that our predecessors have written down
about matters human, natural, and divine. Though we
should not ascribe definitive authority to any one of
these predecessors a priori, we should, I think, begin
with the presumption that we have much to learn
from the great books of our tradition and that we cannot think as well without them as we can with their aid. Indeed, I would push this obvious point one step
further: it is only in conversation with the tradition
that we think well at all. I sometimes even wonder
whether it makes sense to speak of our best thoughts
as being fully our own.
I think that Kass is himself quite properly uneasy
with notions of ownership as applied to thoughts or
ideas. Thus, for example, he begins one paragraph
with the parenthetical remark that "all real thinking is
one's own work," and he later remarks within the
same paragraph that teaching, for the good teacher, is
"not an act of publicizing his own best thoughts." I
would argue that the latter remark is true in a sense
that is somewhat different from the sense that Kass intends. The good teacher finds himself doing his best
thinking in class precisely at those times when his
thoughts are not fully his own. Talk about exclusive
ownership of thinking belongs together with talk about
"knowledge-production," and these notions, as Kass
has helpfully reminded us, pertain to the Weberian
conception of the academic vocation. For me, the concept of tradition best captures this strange and elusive
character of our best thinking: that it is a public activity, as Kass observes, and that it is in some sense ours
but it finally is not fully "our own."
Most, though not all, of Jungkuntz's disagreements
with me stem from his excessively charitable and
hence faulty reading of Weber. Thus, contrary to what
Jungkuntz supposes, when Weber boldly proclaims
that we can in principle master all things by calculation,
he means exactly what he says. He is not stating the
kind of mild truism that Jungkuntz here attributes to
him: "we can master by calculation those things that
are intrinsically susceptible of calculation." For Weber,
there is one and only one kingdom, the natural order;
thus, he does not seek, as Luther did, to restrict the
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operation of reason to its proper realm. The operation
of instrumental rationality is, for Weber, unrestricted,
since the natural realm is the only realm. Finally, for
Weber, reason just is calculation, what Hobbes had
called a reckoning of sums, of causes and effects.
Thus, as I pointed out in my essay, Weber emphatically excluded from his version of the academy the
questions that J ungkuntz most wishes to consider,
questions of purpose, of the good and the bad, and of
the ultimate meaning of our lives.
Since the intellectual revolution that gave rise to
Weberianism did not begin until a century after Luther
(it began, as Kass observes, with Bacon and Descartes),
it seems dubious at best to apply Luther's appreciation
of reason in a straightforward way to an appreciation
of Weber's instrumental rationality. Jungkuntz
nevertheless derives what he takes to be an appropriately Lutheran approval of Weberianism from
Luther's nuanced appreciation of the Scholastics and
the Biblical Humanists. But there really is a world of
difference between William of Occam and Erasmus on
the one hand and Max Weber on the other. When the
two former thinkers spoke of "reason," they, like
Jungkuntz and Luther, referred to the full range of
those human mental powers that make possible a disciplined understanding of the worlds of nature and
culture. When Weber speaks of reason, he means only
the instrumental rationality that calculates the relationship between causes and effects, ends and means.
Occam and Erasmus reasoned about and wrote about
moral and spiritual matters that Weber excludes in
principle from the realm of rational discourse. When
Luther did oppose the reason of an Occam or an Erasmus, he almost invariably did so in order to curb its
vanity. Yet Occam and Erasmus, in terms of the claims
that they made for the powers of reason, were humble
by comparison to Weber.
So long as Jungkuntz does not ascribe his views of
reason, learning, and vocation to Weber, I find myself
in agreement with much that he says. I am troubled,
however, by his claim that my proposals for elevating
the status of the teacher within the academy are astonishing and somehow "contra naturarn." I can imagine that such proposals may be insufficiently radical,
as both Kass and Smith suggest, but I cannot imagine
that they are contrary to nature. Indeed, here I fully
agree with Smith: "Too much has been made in discourse about such matters of th~ reward system. It is
not from Sinai. We have created the present inbalance .... If we don't like it, we can change it. There
are no impediments beyond our own will." Unless
Jungkuntz believes that the "two kingdoms" doctrine
simply legitimates as an order of nature/creation whatever institutional arrangements happen to obtain at a

18

given moment within polities and academies, I think
that he will agree with me, Kass, a nd Smith that the
present second-class status of teachers is not a natural
fact and that this status can therefore be fundamentally changed. Whether he can be also persuaded that
current academic arrangements should be changed
along the lines that any one of us has suggested remains to be seen.
Unfortunately, I cannot possibly, in the space allotted to me, do justice to the range of thoughtful comments my five critics have offered. I can only say that
I am grateful to Messrs. Kass, Smith, Jungkuntz,
Neuhaus, and Marty for accomplishing so well the
purpose of this symposium. The critical observations
of these five gentlemen should surely provoke and
guide further reflection by interested parties on matters of teaching, learning, publishing, and vocation
within the modern academy. And these are all matters
that require serious, immediate, and, yes, radical reconsideration.
Mark R. Schwehn teaches in Christ College at Valparaiso
University and contributes regularly to The Cresset.
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Gabriel
The wires strung to concrete,
where are they? The supporting beams?
He looks to me, and I cannot look
away. Now he looks-with his hand
from behind the construction of wings.
The cornice of his heart is on fire.
Doric columns over the darkness.
He watches me.
And he whispers that one day
his sister Cecilia, all geometry
and air, will bathe me
in her music, as the angels
Pour the sweet oil over the catechumens
on the eve of Easter,
after the eternal bath
before the eternal meal.

Travis Du Priest
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Listening to
Students
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
One reason I write so often
about matters of education is that
virtually every day during the
school year, in my role as an
academic dean, I listen to undergraduate students.
This time of the year they arrive
in Dogwood, a remote town in central Virginia, officially to get an
education. But also to have a good
time, to get a job and a spouse, to
escape from parents, and possibly
to try a new lifestyle. There is often
conflict here, a kind of dissonance-how does one make music
out of the rustle of currency and
the nervous voices trying to impress people, not to mention the
whoosh in the air of time's winged
chariot?
So I am always listening before
talking-listening
for
elusive
melodies and possible rhythms.
Emerging adult life is a sort of
composition just being started.
Sometimes after listening for a
while I repeat back the music that
I hear, and the composer sometimes affirms that my echo is faithful. Sometimes we actually engage

Charles Vandersee has retur:ned to
Dogwood from Colorado, New Mexico,
and T exas.
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in collaborative composition, ending with a sort of mutual applause;
other times we break off almost arbitrarily, as if today is a day not for
music but for the silence between
movements.
Even after some ten years, I can
still be surprised by both dissonance and melody. Right now, as
classes resume, I think for example
of A., a brilliant student who has
not done well. He has test scores in
the 700s but mediocre grades. Last
year, in several careful and analytic
conversations, we tried to get at the
difficulty, and he has of course not
confined himself to me, an
amateur, for counseling.
We finally constructed a moment-by-moment account of what it
feels like when he tries to study.
His story is new, without the conventional dissonances: procrastination, partying, a bad choice of
courses, a time-consuming job,
agony over a career, conflict with
parents, financial misery, nonexistent study habits. Also not that
enervating drone called "depression."
The story of A. has to do with
"woolgathering" or the "mind wandering," but on a transcontinental
scale. When he starts to read an assignment for class, any sentence or
idea can lead him away into extraneous thoughts-into a fascinating sequence of ideas and speculations. Soon hours have passed, in
absorbing mental activity, but the
work assigned has not been
touched.
Since there must be a name for
this sort of thing, I referred him to
a friendly, knowledgeable person in
the psychology department, with
instructions to report back. A day
or so later, seeing the psychologist
at a Dogwood garden party, I told
him to expect a visit from A., and
why. To my astonishment, he not
only recognized the problem but is
himself plagued by the same tendency of the brain to roam uncon-

trollably along the blue highways.
He too had been a mediocre student in college. No, there is not a
name for this condition.
Yes, there are things you can do
about it. First, plan to work for no
more than ten minutes at a time. If
you get that far, stop to congratulate yourself. Then start in for
another ten-minute stretch. Second,
do all your work-all your reading,
writing, figuring, thinking-standing up. Get a drafting table or
some other big surface, but never
sit down at a desk, lie on the floor,
or stretch out on a comfortable
couch. You are different.
The student and the professor
have since connected. A. says he
feels, for the first time in recent
years, some hope for accomplishment in the future. It has helped to
know that one other live human
being suffers the same way. The
professor is emphatic about the
agony and reality of the problem.
"I have outlined a thousand books
in my mind, over the years," he
told me, "when I was supposed to
be doing other things."
Another student comes to mind
because her mother wrote me just
after spring semester ended. Her
daughter, B., is a quiet person, who
had stopped in to see me a number
of times, feeling the enormous
stress of a university perhaps oversupplied with glib, rather sophisticated suburban Yuckies-to-be. A
first-year student coming from a
small town in the mountains has a
lot of adjusting to do.
Examining her record and her
abilities, I had urged B. to take a
literature course for majors rather
than one of our introductory
courses. So her mother writes, in a
long, emotional letter, and B. took
the course. She not only received
an A, but had her term paper read
aloud by the course instructor (one
of our more demanding teachers)
as exemplary. What's more, her
suitemates, mostly from the
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Washington area, have pleaded
with her to visit them during the
summer. They want her company.
A child almost desperately lacking
in self-confidence, fee ling dismally
different from everyone else, has
seen and heard incontrovertible
evidence about her abilities and her
place in Dogwood as an adult valued and loved by others. Her
mother has to put her joy into
words.
I think of C., a black student,
raised by his grandmother in a
pentecostal church, a fellow with
gifts of charm, social ease, resolution, and intelligence-and musical
and political skills-beyond the deserving of any one person. He is
now in Harvard Law School and
loving it.
I also think of the many talks we
had over four years, conversations
of candor and caution. He knew he
would have an edge getting into a
top law school, by being bright and
black. I knew that edge meant nothing unless he showed academic accomplishment while here in Dogwood. Our four years of "collaborative composition" emphasized his
taking the strong courses and honors program he was capable of,
while keeping under control his
commitments to student government and a half-dozen other activities. Occasional wavering needs
a few timely words .
D. comes to mind, who phoned
me at home with a story I cou ld
not have suspected from our casual
talks in the office. Uncontrollably
driven by the desire to do well, but
paralyzed by timed exams, she had
made a halfhearted suicide attempt. Fortunately friends were
close by and took her to the
emergency room. She was now letting me know of the situation; facing and admitting her crisis, she
was going home to spend the summer under professional counseling.
In cases of this sort it is a mistake
not to ask gently whether any re-
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ligious or spiritual tradition is
fami liar enough to draw on . More
surprising information: "I don't
know. I was raised as a Roman
Catholic, but this year I've been involved in an evangelical Protestant
group, and now I'm confused
about religion." That kind of dissonance, on top of everything else!

There really are few
satisfactions equaling
the successful effort
to echo the music that
is inside someone else.
I think simultaneously of E. and
F., alum ni, the former a brash,
energetic editor in New York with
one of those expensive newsletters
for entrepreneurs. When E. told
me he needed an assistant, but that
a lot of super people in New York
were also applying, I made known
the opportunity to current members of our scholars' program . F.,
also brash, energetic, bright, and
ambitious, about to graduate with
an interdisciplinary major in bioethics, immediately stormed into
my office, eyes flashing (I used to
think "storming" and "eyes flashing" were absurd bits of rhetoric):
''I'm going to get that job! " We discussed strategy.
Two years later, he still has the
job and has been promoted . He has
done substantial writing for the
London Economist, has learned
from trade fairs and much interviewing what is going on in
technology today, and has become
a professional writer, brisk and
quick. He knows his talents well
and has contemplated a career in
New York, investments or journalism. When he stopped by last
summer, however, his aim was to
secure a recommendation for medical school.
Could I carry on this alphabet of

engrossing stories to Z. and
beyond? Easily, just as the rich
hymnodv of today offers us not
only German chorale music and
French medieval chants but Negro
spirituals and shape-note tunes
from the Southern mountains.
A few general observations instead.
First, the hours spent weekly as
an undergraduate academic adviser, particularly as dean of a program for extremely gifted people,
are hours of unpredictable interest
and stimulation. Even for one who
is not a great natural lover of
people and ideas, preferring the vitality of words and places. I learn a
lot. The variety of existential coping and crisis is always before methe materials out of which books
and ballads could be made.
Second, though it's a fad these
days in counseling to stress careful
listening and then the attempt to
repeat in one's own words what
one thinks one is hearing, there really are few satisfactions equaling
the successful effort to echo the
music inside someone else. It must
be . something like a definitive
choral or instrumental performance. A hole in two, a triple with
bases loaded.
Third, we live by words and
places as much as by people and
ideas. Merely for the sufferer to
put things into words, as the person listening keeps asking for
clarification, often mutes the overlying noise. The dissonance itself
changes, as various components of
the noise begin to wane. Beneath,
the music seems to have some sort
of form and shape.
Many a conversation- m the
dean's office ends with a thank-you
from the visitor, the dean having
said almost nothing, having given
little overt help. He may only have
affirmed that he too heard the
music. Feelings got placed into
words, and words got shaped into
sentences dealing with causes and
The Cresset

effects. To the repeated question,
"What else might have a bearing
on this situation?" responses not
only accumulated but began to
shape themselves into a coherent
whole.
And the change of place was important. The student walked away
from the institutional walls of a
dorm or a stereo-ridden apartment
and entered a Stanford White
room with a high vaulted ceiling
and a view of the sky. That itself
may have conferred new insight; to
think well, one needs distance and
detachment, and awareness of the
cosmos.

I am often reminded ,
especially at the
beginning of the school
year, that life does not
routinely become art.
A fourth conclusion reached over
the years: Though problems tend
to be paradigmatic, and, yes, there
is such a thing as North American
twentieth-century "human nature,"
nonetheless, the cardinal assumption to make is that Student G.,
now walking in, will present a case
that is different. No one in this
room over the years has displayed
quite her own personal history and
configuration of possible decisions.
This is why it took several visits
from Student A. We had to get rid
of the paradigms first. One by one
we examined and discarded-as, I
suppose, Pound had to escape
Browning's influence, and Eliot
had to get past Lafargue. Composition is a strange process; it seems
to involve improvisation, systematic
search, and a fair amount of bricolage-picking up bits and pieces of
things, in different places. When
making up the special advising
packet last spring, for the 165 new
scholars this fall, I put on the cover
September, 1985

some words of Martin Buber: "All
journeys have secret destinations,
of which the traveler is unaware." Finally, though these transactions with students are the kinds
of human materials out of which
novels and stories might germinate,
I am frequently reminded, especially at the beginning of the school
year, that life does not routinely
become art. In reporting a few
"cases," I recognize their dramatic
possibilities. But I limit and modify
the data. What transpires in a
counselor's office is confidential,
despite the collective insight into
our Zeitgeist. I make notes, sometimes brief, sometimes elaborate;
they remain locked in the office
files, from which they are purged
and destroyed after a while.
Though absorbing, the stories
are evanescent, fragmented, and
sometimes, after four undergraduate years, such unfinished
compositions that the imagination
wants to supply denouement and
closure. One would like to see these
stories of young Americans turned
into art, by someone conscientious
and deliberate like Willa Cather,
who in the persona of her narrator,
Jim Burden , tells of the "Danish
laundry girls and the three Bohemian Marys" of pioneer Nebraska.
There is a "relation between girls
like those and the poetry of V ergil.
If there were no girls like them in
the world , there would be no
poetry."
So I greet each new year with
mixed expectations. Again this year
I probably will begin and not finish
One Hundred Years of Solitude, just as
I will not get any farther into Remembrance of Things Past or reread
Ulysses. But I will know once again
from A. to Z. why novels and
stories worth reading have been
written , and why without them we
do not have very much music or
knowledge in our lives.
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,
Cl
C.V.

The 18th Brumaire
Of TV News
James Combs
John Chancellor was mad. I
know it is hard to imagine such a
thing from a man who seems so
owlish and calm, like a comfortable
political science professor who usually speaks as if he were delivering
a seminar lecture on Kant's influence on political philosophy. But
this time gentle John was good and
mad. And he was mad not at Jesse
Helms, who wants to fire Dan
Rather and turn CBS News into
Mr. Reagan's Neighborhood; nor
Ted Turner, who doesn't have an
ideological agenda but does let his
will-to-power hang out; nor Phyllis
George, the penultimate dimpled
graduate of the Ken-and-Barbie
school of broadcasting; nor Werner
Wolff, the highly-paid sportscaster
who pioneered the idea that
sportscasters have to shout. Nope,
John was mad at Tom Shales, the
syndicated Washington Post TV critic, who had the effrontery, the gall ,
the misguided and uninformed and
mean-spirited gumption to suggest,
both in print and on one of those
interminable
ape-contemplatinghimself-in-the-mirror shows where

James Combs teaches Political Science
at Valparaiso University and comments
regularly on Television for The Cresset.
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media types analyze how they're
doing, that "the hostage crisis had
to be wrapped up this [past]
weekend simply because the viewing public was getting sick of it."
Oh, did that make the venerable
anchorman
furious.
Why,
to
suggest that the news divisions of
the networks were using the hostages, that they were scripting the
crisis like a mini-series, that the visibility and play given the story was
somehow related to Nielsen ratings
and market shares-why, the very
idea runs against the grain of all
those lectures on "Ethics and Objectivity in the Media" that John
would like to have given if he had
followed his true professorial callmg.
Shales caught a lot of heat for his
cynical suggestion that television
newspeople have motives of hype
similar to their colleagues over in
programming. His was an argument that few Establishment critics
will countenance: that news is
hyped, that stories like hostage
dramas get extensive coverage because of their dramatic power, and
that newsmakers' interest in, and
conferral of the status of "crisis"
on, a story is most assuredly related
to the fact that people want to
watch such stories. With that old
textbook on Journalistic Ethics on
the bookshelf in their offices, the
powers that be who "decide what's
news" will not admit to the principle of hype as blatantly as, say,
Madonna's
agent,
but
hype
nonetheless it is: the deliberate
selection of the sensational, the
shameless focus on the emotional
(close-ups of crying relatives), the
cooperation with wrongdoers, the
packaging and selling of news. TV
news has often been accused of reducing everything to bad melodrama, and the hostage story had it
all, from sentimentality to intensified peril to bathos to reunion .
Chancellor's outburst did symbolize one thing that was made
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crystal clear about TV newspeople.
They are almost pathologically selfconscious nowadays, and during
and after such a "major" story
spend as much time covering the
coverage as covering the story. Everything from Accuracy in Media
to attempted hostile takeovers has
contributed to this , as has, no
doubt, their own learned sense of
"responsible reporting" which nags
them through the more outrageous
moments of hyped news. So during
the Beirut affair, they bent over
backwards to be self-critical. Dan
Rather expressed outrage at the
press for the staged "press conference" the hostages were allowed to
hold during their captivity. ("That
was a disgrace for us, " he said.)
They criticized each other: ABC,
for example, caught a lot of flak
for the rumors that it paid the
Amal Shiites $30,000 to interview
the hijackers at the plane site.

One had the sense during
the hostage crisis that
TV reporters, and the
national press in
general, were trying
hard to be more royalist
than the King.
Indeed, one even had the sense
that TV reporters, and the National press in general, were trying
hard to be more royalist than the
King. They were quite familiar
with the charge that they are all liberal softies, unpatriotic, sympathetic to evildoers, and so on. So
everyone from Rather to David
Broder
out-Reaganed
Reagan .
Rather's emotionally-charged lurid
language describing how the one
passenger was executed was worthy
not only of True Detective but also
Human Events. Broder urged turning the Beirut airport into the
Grand Canyon. Tom Braden fa-

vored assassination. (By comparison, Reagan was a voice of moderation and restraint, rather gracefully
eating a bit of crow but avoiding
any really precipitous talk like
"Iran will cease to exist," circa
1979-80.)
Shales was right about the hype,
but he was wrong on an associated
point. Shales came to the wrong
conclusion when he wrote, "Ronald
Reagan says, 'There will be no
forgetting, ' but that's debatable. If
all we learn from history is that we
do not learn, all we remember
from television is that we do not remember." That is just not so, in
two senses. Television may be an
"immediate experience," part of
our life in the simultaneous world
of now-ism , but it is part of a culture, and cannot help but reflect
some of the enduring themes of
that culture. Too, television viewers
have memories, and in particular
memories of what they have witnessed on television in the recent
past. Let us look at how these two
forms of memory related to the
mass-mediated hijacking of TWA
Flight 847.
Two researchers , John Lawrence
and Bernard Timberg, recently did
a book entitled Ritual N ews and Images of Captivity, tracing a remarkable and revealing theme that endures in American popular culture:
the captivity narrative ritually retold , in ever new forms and media,
ranging from the books written by
whites who were taken captive by
Indians and later escaped, to the
dime novels, down through cases
such as Hearst's hype over the
Spanish in Cuba jailing Evangelina
Cisneros and the Lindbergh kidnapping. Such tales are "ritual
news" in the sense that the melodrama has certain repeated features: people who are part of Us
are taken by Them, often innocent
women and children ; we fear that
they will be possessed and converted by Them, or killed , or sexuThe Cresset

ally violated; we must search for
and free them before they no
longer want to come home, and
punish those who have taken them
away from the peaceable kingdom.
It is important to note that not
every culture (the Soviet Union, for
example) has so much fascination
with the captivity narrative. But in
America the story line pops up
again and again, and news stories
about captivity continue to fascinate
us. One can think of several recent
captivity stories that have dominated news and inspired popular
dramas and even serious thought.
Younger readers will not remember the uproar and interest
generated by the "twenty-one who
stayed," the American POWs who
chose to stay in North Korea rather
than return to America after the
Korean War. We could not imagine
that Americans, especially soldiers,
could consciously choose to stay in
an Un-world rather than return
home. So we, through the medium
of pop psychology, diagnosed them
as crazy (a much earlier explanation of the Stockholm Syndrome).
Since then, we have focused our
anger and frustration, and indeed
our fascination, on hostage dramas
such as the Pueblo capture, the
Vietnam POWs, the Patty Hearst
case, the Mayaguez fiasco, and of
course the Iran ordeal. We marveled at the surgical success of the
Israeli commando raid at Entebbe,
made two instant docudramas for
TV about it, modeled rescue teams
of our own after their unit, and
tried to send the cavalry into the
seized embassy in Tehran to demonstrate to both Them and Us
whose mythology would prevail.
In the 1980s, two recurrent captivity narratives persist. The domestic one is missing children, either
runaways caught up in alien undergrounds such as porn and prostitution rings or those who have been
kidnapped by a parent or worse.
TV responded by stories such as
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Adam and Missing, exploiting a national phenomenon but also intuitively understanding our attraction
and revulsion toward captivity
stories. The continuing foreign
captivity fantasy, of course, is the
Vietnam MIAs, which both politicians and popular culture have
kept alive.

Those among us who have
doubts abou·t the
President will be much
relieved if we hear that
he is watching movies
like Friendly Persuasion
rather than Rambo.
The MIA story has really hit a
nerve in the Eighties, and both the
movies and TV have used that tale
to great advantage. Angry Vietnam
vets return to Nam to rescue their
buddies whom the government
won't get out, and in the process
wreak vengeance on those slimy
Slopes, proving that we could have
won the war after all if only the
politicians had let us. The most
notorious of such fantasies was Sylvester Stallone's Rambo, who manages to ice some Russkies for good
measure. (Reagan's understanding
of popular culture was never better
illustrated than in his grasp of the
importance of the captivity narrative, first in the Grenada speech,
explaining that there the cavalry
did come 'just in time" and that
"the nightmare of our hostages in
Iran must never be repeated"; and
secondly in his appreciation of
Rambo: "Boy, I saw Rambo last
night. I know what to do the next
time this happens." Those among
us who still have doubts about the
President will be much relieved if
we hear that he's watching movies
like Friendly Persuasion.)
The hostage crisis brought new
life to the captivity narrative. The

bizarre odyssey and then the disappearance into the Beirut netherworld of the American passengers
of Flight 84 7 riveted our attention
once again . It was the latest version
of our oldest tale. And this is the
second sense in which Shales was
wrong. The television audience for
the story had learned from history,
and recognized immediately the
importance of the captivity drama.
And they had remembered and
learned from TV history, especially
the Iranian story, how the drama is
supposed to unfold, how the roles
are played, what the possible outcomes of the story might be (including death), and how the actors
are supposed to respond to the
cameras. Everyone, including the
hijackers, knew the history and importance of media coverage of hostage dramas, and conducted themselves with those references in
mind.
For that reason, if you had a
sense not only of deja vu, but also
of bathos (i.e., flatness, triteness, insincere or overdone pathos, sentimentalism, elements of ludicrousness), it was probably for that
reason. It was not an original
drama, and everyone was self-conscious about it. Thus it seemed less
interesting, more forced, after a
while less perilous, even in many
ways preposterous. One is reminded of Marx's famous remark
from The Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Napoleon about how history
repeats itself, first as tragedy, and
then as farce. The Iranian story, in
that light, would have been the
original "tragic" media dramaserious, sad, consequential-leading
to the remarkable denouement of
Inauguration Day, 1981. The
Beirut story was a secondary
drama, almost farcical, but certainly
a simulated drama-ironic, mimetic, even comic-that lacked the intensity and originality of Iran.
This is not to say that the Beirut
story was not "real," only that it

23

was stale, and Shales' argument
that so enraged Chancellor may
have a kernel of truth in it. The
Beirut story was a variation on a
cultural theme, but it was too much
like the original Iranian story to
sustain prolonged interest. If such
storytelling is "ritualized," then this
version lacked the didactic function
of ritual. When the hostages were
photographed fraternizing with
their "captors" (a much nicer term
than "terrorist"), driving cars, taking pictures, eating nice meals,
holding press conferences, this
seemed a bit much. When the networks trotted out the same media
psychologists and out-of-office expert consultants, when they began
to count the days of captivity, maneuver their way into the hostages'
relatives' homes to get reactions to
televised reactions, try to scoop
each
other
with
Washington
rumors, and fill in the dead spots
with features of reporters interviewing each other, they were repeating the kind of coverage of the
Iran story without the same ability
to evoke emotions.
It began to turn into what Bernard Goldberg of CBS admitted
was "theatre of the absurd," and
everyone began to understand that
audiences were tuning out. We may
even specu late how much of this
was sensed by the Middle Eastern
actors in the drama-the terrorists,
the Amal leadership, Berri, Assad,
even the Iranians. They understood the importance of American
media exposure or the hijacking
wouldn't have occurred in the first
place; so perhaps they understood
the hard facts of ratings and fickle
audiences, and decided they had
made their point and should not
further test the audience's patience.
Like the American viewing public
that tired quickly of the story, they
had learned more than the media
people had from the precedent of
Iran. The second time around is a
self-conscious second act, so hype it
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for what you can, and quit whi le
you're ahead. (Terrorist schools
probably have classes not on ly m
Arms and Explosives but also m
Media Tactics.)
"Television turns everything, finally," wrote Shales in the same offending colu mn, "into television.
All the world's a show ... " Perhaps
the television show of Flight 84 7 is
a good example of what has been
called "the society of the spectacle,"
the tendency of media such as television to focus on the spectacular,
to be sure, but also to enjoin our
passive participation in the spectacle as if it were only a how. Such
a confusion of reality and appearance has been one of the most telling criticisms of television, and one
the networks cannot easily explain
away
with journa li sm-school
rhetoric. But they also cannot easily
abandon the formula of mixed
"real-fictions," nor ignore people's
mythological and media expectations. The spectacle of Flight 84 7
was a creature of television, and included all of the strengths and
weaknesses of that medium. Every
actor in the story needed television
for one reason or another, and the
logic and thrust of the story proceeded on the assumption that the

appearances projected around the
world wou ld affect perceptions and
power. We now live in a political
world in which we cannot turn the
cameras off, except by everyone's
consent. Then we turn the cameras
on another spectacle. Television is
itself an actor in the drama.
The centrality of spectacle was
sensed by Barbara Rosen, the wife
of one of the Iranian hostages, who
appeared on CBS Morning News
during the mini-crisis. She said that
she told one of that show's producers that she wouldn't "come on and
talk about 'what it's like to be a hostage's wife.' This isn't a drama.
This isn't something that's on
Broadway. This is a real-life crisis."
Yes, but the real-life crisis is transformed into a television appearance, which, as Shales said, "denatures horrible events and packages
them in a convenient container." So
the hostage story had a happy ending, and everybody in the TV spectacle got what he wanted. But
Rosen 's point reminds us of the
limits of appearance. I keep thinking of the one person who didn't
get what he wanted, the beaten and
murdered American soldier lying
dead and abandoned on the tarmac
at Beirut airport.
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What's My Cue?
John Steven Paul
While staying in Williamsburg,
Virginia (which is, by the way, just
down the road from Dogwood, Virginia) one tends, inevitably, to
think of things national. In the
taverns of the old Colonial capital
of Virginia the ghosts of our
forefathers are never further than
a bended elbow away, and the College of William and Mary (home of
the Virginia Shakespeare Festival)
is the alma mater of the nation.
The town is also within easy driving range of Washington, D.C.,
where every third building houses
the national something-or-other, including the new major non-profit
theatre company at the Kennedy
Center called "the American National Theatre."
But a journey to the American
National Theatre this month puts
one in the middle of its "Chicago
season." For this writer, that is a
time and space journey in a backward and westerly direction to four
productions which originated in
Chicago during the past two years.

John Steven Paul, who teaches and
directs plays at Valparaiso University,
spent the summer directing Shakespeare
for children and business-managing the
Virginia Shakespeare Festival in Williamsburg. He is the Theatre critic for
The Cresset.
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Jack Henry Abbott's dramatized
prison letters, Tn the Belly of the
Beast, and Kabuki Medea have come
to the nation's capital from the
Wisdom Bridge Theatre, and Coyote
Ugly, a comic tale of incest on the
Great American Desert, and David
Rabe's third Viet Nam play, Streamers-the latter starring Gary Sinise
and the former directed by John
Malkovich-from the Steppenwolf
group.
There is again a ringing Chicago
presence in New York this summer. Orphans, a new play by Lyle
Kessler and a Steppenwolf original
directed by Gary Sinise, is playing
to raves on Theatre Row on 42nd
Street, and John Malkovich has recently directed a warmly-received
production of Shaw's Arrns and the
Man for the Circle in the Square
theatre. Perhaps the most interesting development in the New York
non-profit theatre is the accession
of Gregory Mosher to the Artistic
Directorship of the Lincoln Center
Theatre Company, which will
reopen the Mitzi E. Newhouse and
Vivian Beaumont Theatres that
have been virtually dark for years.
Mosher has been the artistic leader
of Chicago's Goodman Theatre for
the past several years and has recently inaugurated The New
Theatre Company in association
with playwrights David Mamet and
John Guare, and others.
The Mosher-Mamet team made
May a Mamet month in Chicago.
Mosher directed two of Mamet's
newest plays, The Spanish Prisoner
and The Shawl at the Briar Street
Theatre, and the Goodman revived
Mamet's 1978 play The Water Engine on its main stage.
There is very little that is graspable in The Spanish Prisoner. What we
know is that a man (played by
Peter Riegert) and a woman (by
Lindsay Crouse, David Mamet's
wife) sit in conversation at a table.
The man speaks and the woman
listens, and she occasionally speaks

a word or two herself. The table is
set in no locale; it surfaces, lighted,
out of a lake of darkness and floating in the smoke of the man's
cigarette. The man and the woman
are unnamed and unremarkable.
Their relationship is unexplored,
their story untold. Mamet, in this
case, has either never invented
plot, character, and setting, or he
has pared them away, submitting
only the unconnected (dare I say
"dangling") conversation to be considered by the audience.
The nature of the exchange itself
is obscure. The man embarks upon
a monologue. Is the man reciting,
reminiscing, or rehearsing? Is the
monologue a speech from a play, a
memory, a dream, an alibi? The
content is undecipherable. (There
is no reference to a "Spanish Prisoner.") The story seems momentarily traceable; then, the woman interrupts. Is she prompting? Correcting? Coaching? At her intrusion
the monologue changes course.
The pattern continues: an extended segment of monologue, a
diverting interruption, a new direction. And so to the end of the conversation, which ends at a no more
logical point than it began.
Like The Spanish Prisoner, The
Shawl opens on a man and a
woman in conversation at a table.
This table, however, is located in a
room. Three windows at the back
are heavily draped floor to ceiling
with olive-toned drapery. When
they are shut, the room is sealed
and stifling; when the curtains are
drawn they reveal only that the flat
is above street level. The speakers
are identified as well. The man
(played by Mike Nussbaum) is a
professional medium. The woman
(by Lindsay Crouse) is a potential
client, who has come to communicate with her deceased mother. Distraught and desperate for counsel
on a financial matter, she simultaneously wishes to believe in the
medium's supernatural powers and
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doubts his power to reach beyond
the grave.
A light on the table brings it into
focus in the dimly lit room. The
medium directs the conversation.
He tells the woman a story that
seems to be about her life, herself,
her family. As he develops the
story, the woman guardedly contributes a word or phrase. He
generalizes; she specifies. He
suggests; she confirms. He asserts;
she wonders at his knowledge of
things only she would know. By the
end of the conversation, the
medium has won a modicum of the
woman's confidence. After agreeing to return, and leaving a small
unrequested earnest payment, she
departs.
When the woman leaves, the
drapes are drawn and the man is
joined by a coarse and attractive
young hustler (Gary Cole). The boy
finds the man's profession intriguing and the man finds the boy desirable. Eager to make a score, the
hustler presses the medium to ply
his techniques in separating the
woman from her money. The man
assures the boy that he cannot
work that way. A successful transaction, he notes, is the result of a
painstaking series of sensitive conversations that form a culture of
trust which then sprouts information. Self-interested references to
money might corrupt the trust that
is necessary for the process to bear
fruit. Information comes from the
client, unwittingly , in the form of
verbal and visual clues. The professional medium seizes each bit of information and enlarges upon it by
researching documents in libraries
and other public repositories. In
subsequent conversations, he offers
this information to his client, implying "that he has gained it from a
supernatural
source,
thereby
gradually bonding his client to him.
When a suggestion or an assertion
is off the mark, the bond ts
loosened.
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The boy loses patience with the
process, and the man, realizing his
affection has been misdirected,
sends him away. In the final conversation, there is only the medium
and the woman. The man again
takes up the story, piecing together
bits of information which, we now
believe, he has gotten not from the
realm of the spirits, but from very
mundane sources. The conversation proceeds, the suspense builds.
The medium 's knowledge of the
woman's interior life startles her
and her confidence in him grows.
Has the medium contacted her
mother? She confirms more of his
assertions, until , at the climax of
the play, the medium specifically
describes a red shawl in which the
woman's mother had lovingly wrapped her; a shawl now lost. It is
clear to her, and to us, that no material source could have yielded this
image. The psychic bonding is
complete.

David Mamet explores
conversation with the
curiosity of a child who
takes apart a clock
to see how it works.
The Shawl sheds some light on
the more difficult Spanish Prisoner.
The first piece is structurally similar to, perhaps even a study for,
the second. The centerpiece of
both is a conversation between a
man and a woman. In The Shawl,
conversations are means to an end.
In The Spanish Prisoner, there is
only a conversation, a phenomenon
which the playwright seems to be
exploring with the curiosity of a
child who takes apart a clock to see
how it works. What is the nature of
its mechanism? What is its function? What is its purpose?
Conversation is not a new interest for Mamet. In his first play,

American Buffalo, Mamet takes us
through a day's worth of conversations in which three men complain,
philosophize, plot, and commiserate while passing the day in a Chicago junk shop. The first act of his
recent play about real estate salesmen, Glengarry Glen Ross, is set in
an out-of-the-way booth of a
Chinese restaurant, into which
pairs of men slide for private conversations. In these intimate, intense exchanges the men reveal
their disappointments, their needs ,
their fears, their resentments. The
most memorable speech in that
play is one delivered by the real estate firm's ace salesman to a total
stranger. Although the listener contributes practically nothing verbally
to the conversation, there is a clear
sense of communication between
the two. And, as the salesman articulates his philosophy of life, a
bond develops between the sales. man and the stranger which is similar to that between the medium
and his client in The Shawl. In both
situations, conversation is used to
build trust and produce a successful transaction.
Conversation is a form of
dialogue. That dialogue would be
the foundation of Western drama
was established when the ancient
Greek actor Thespis stepped out of
the chorus line and exchanged
speeches with the chorus leader.
Twenty-five hundred years later,
European dramatists of the later
nineteenth century, especially Ibsen
and Shaw, moved dialogue out of
the public arena and into the drawing room, rendering it into the natural conversational form that we
have come to expect from modern
domestic drama. Talk and action
may sometimes seem to be opposite
aspects of drama, but it was the
particular innovation of the early
modern dramatists to make conversation the vehicle of action. That is,
conversational language, charged
with the forces of ideas and emoThe Cresset

tions, became the ground of action.
The conversationalists became combatants, as the dramatists employed
statements and responses in lieu of
fist and sword. The reciprocal
strike and counterstrike of conversation moved the action of the plot
from exposition through complication to climax and denouement.
While David Mamet's language is
certainly emotionally charged, he is
less interested in using it to drive
his plot-indeed, his plays reflect
little interest in plot in the traditional sense at all. Mamet's conversations have their own integrity;
they are not necessarily setting us
up for the next scene. Formally,
they enlarge upon the present moment, rather than look to a future
one. And , unlike Glengarry Glen
Ross, in which the playwright takes
care to tell a story, The Spanish Prisoner and The Shawl are focused almost exclusively on the conversation as an object of dramatic interest.
In a David Mamet conversation,
characters are engaged in more
than reciprocating line for line and
speech for speech. After one of the
conversationalists opens with a subject, his partners lend support in
developing that subject: contributing a word, clarifying a concept,
even finishing a sentence. The
characters build the conversational
structure together and the conversation, in turn, bonds them. In this
typical conversation from Glengarry
Glen Ross, two salesmen, desperate
for a break in their string of bad
luck, move haltingly toward a
partnership:
Aaronow: How many leads have we
got?
Moss: The Glengarry ... the premium
leads . . . ? I'd say we got five
thousand. Five. Five thousand leads.
Aaronow: And you 're saying a fella
could take and sell these leads to
Jerry Graff.
Moss: Yes.
Aaronow: How do you know he'd buy
them?
Moss: Graff? Because I worked for
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him.
Aaronow: You haven't talked to him .
Moss: No. What do you mean? Have
I talked to him about this? (Pause. )
Aaronow: Yes. I mean are you
actually talking about this, or are we
just ...
Moss : No, we're just ...
Aaronow: We're just " talking" about it.
Moss : We're just speaking about it.
(Pause. ) As an idea.
Aaronow: As an idea.
Moss: Yes.
Aaronow : We're not actually talking
about it.
Moss: No.
Aaronow: As a robbery.
Moss: As a "robbery"?! No.
Aaronow: Well. Well ...
Moss: Hey. (Pause.)

How does a Mamet conversation,
any conversation, work? What
drives it? The answer is as simple
as the answer to the question,
"When is it my turn to speak?" Or,
as an actor would ask, "What's my
cue?" Both the skilled conversationalist and the skilled actor
know how to give a cue and to take
a cue. The listener may take his
cue from something spoken or unspoken, from vocal tone or silence,
or from any of a variety of gestures
with the head or hand. He may
speak in turn, interrupt, or chime
in. Cueing drives the conversation
and gives it its rhythm. Because
conversation is such a standard
part of our own experience, we
recognize and respond to the
rhythms of Mamet's conversations.
And, perhaps because the actor is
trained and experienced in the art
of cueing, Mamet's conversational
language is best realized on the
stage.
II

The Water Engine was originally
written , in 1977, in the style of a
classic radio melodrama for presentation on National Public Radio's
Earplay. It is a complex work with
several story lines, all of which develop almost simultaneously, but
each on an individual aural channel. On one channel is the story of

an idealistic young scientist, Charles
Lang, who comes up with a revolutionary idea: an engine that uses
distilled water for fuel. The young
genius has discovered a way of
separating the hydrogen from the
water and using the gas for fuel.
Of course, such an engine would
forever change the industrial
world. However, as soon as the inventor takes his idea to a patent
lawyer to protect his rights of ownership, persons opposed to such
radical change move in to keep him
from manufacturing the device.
First they try to buy the engine
from him and, when he resists ,
they try to take it away from him.
Ultimately, the anonymous representatives of reaction murder the
young man.

Both the skilled
conversationalist and
the skilled actor know
how to give a cue and
how to take a cue.
Charles Lang's story is set in Chicago in 1934 during the time of
"The Century of Progress" (The
Chicago World 's Fair) . The voices
of the Fair and its main attraction,
the Hall of Science, are on a background channel. Thus, Science is in
the air and on the air. "Science,"
the announcer intones the credo of
the great Hall, "the Concrete
Poetry
of
humankind.
Our
thoughts, our dreams, our aspirations rendered into practical and
useful forms. Our science is ourself."
On yet a third channel, a chain
letter makes its way from recipient
to recipient. The letter has its own
"voice." The letter tells each reader
the stories of people who maintained and who broke the chain;
promises beneficences if one dollar
1s sent to the top three people on
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the list, and threatens dire consequences shou ld the letter's instructions fail to be followed. At the end
of its long message, the chain letter
offers the following wisdom :
Great Wealth and Fame stand just
beyond your grasp.
All civilization stands on trust.
All people are connected.
No one can call back what one man
does.
Much is known and much will yet be
known and much wi ll not be known .

There are other channels in The
Water Engine, incl uding those over
which voices champion and attack
the American free-market economy, but Mamet brings these particu lar three together in a clever
way. Those who would destroy the
inventor-'s idea rather than let it
change the world have wrecked his
laboratory and kidnapped his sister. Now a goon squad is out to kill
the inventor. In order to protect
himself and his invention, the
young scientist takes the blueprints
for his engine and ducks into the
crowds at the Exposition's Hall of
Science. He remains until closing
time, when a friendly guard ushers
him to the door. The guard, noticing that the young man is glum,
reads him a letter that he received
in the mail that day. It happens to
be the chain letter, with its words
of wisdom: "All people are connected. No man can call back what
one man does." The word reassure the inventor that an idea is
not the property of one man or
another; that no one can own or
protect a thing as important to the
world as an engine that runs on
water. He shows the blueprints to
the exposition guard and then
mails the plans for the marvelous
engine to the people listed in the
chain letter. The next morning, the
Daily News will report the mysterious drowning death of a young
man and his sister. That same
morning a boy, a promising student of science, will receive in the
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mail a set of blue prints for a mysterious engine.
When The Water Engine was
transformed from a radio production to a fu ll y staged work for the
St. Nicholas Theater, d irected by
Steven Schachter, and later for the
New York Shakespeare Festival, its
radio character was retained by
staging the play as a live radio
drama in production. The recent
Goodman Theatre revival offered a
visual feast. The big-time radio
studio was reproduced on stage in
all its Art Deco glory. Every visible
surface and line paid aesthetic
homage to technology triumphant
as smoked glass and brilliant
chromium reflected each other's
image. Every single piece of equipment was consistent with the larger
design:
microphones,
stands,
chairs, tables, doors, and the inexorable clock.

The recent Goodman
Theatre revival of
Mamet's The Water
Engine offered the
audience a visual feast.
The theatre audience was integrated into the production as the
live audience at the studio. The
evocation of the studio experience
was flawless. When we arrived we
were welcomed from the stage by a
host, who directed our attention to
the clock, warmed us up with a
couple of jokes, and taught us the
signals for applause and quiet. At a
given moment, the studio "went
live" and suddenly we sensed our
connection with a far-reaching
radio network in whose flagship
studio we rose to sing the National
Anthem. Then followed a series of
songs from a torch singer in
sequined sheath gown; these were
interspersed with commercials and
promotional announcements for
the imminent network presentation

of The Water Engine.
As the time approached for the
play to be aired, the actors took
their positions at tables and microphones, the musroan at the
keyboards, and the sound effects
man-in some ways the most dazzling performer in the showmoved to his console. The actual
performance of The Water Engine
resembled nothing so much as a
symphony of sound and movement. Each individual in the studio
knew his assignments, moved to his
positions, and executed his tasks
with precision. The controlled
dynamism of the production was
enthralling. Some scenes were
played from stationary positions,
others were simply staged in various locations on the stage. All settings were suggested by sounds.
The voices on Mamet's various
channels were distinguished, not
on ly by spotlighting the actors who
embodied them, but also by effecting tonal coloring through levels of
amplification, proxrmrty to microphones, and musical accompaniment.
The key to the smooth functioning of this production was efficient
cueing, thus linking the piece formally to Mamet's other work. In a
sense, The Water Engine is a theatre
piece about cueing. One imagines
the director's job to be similar to
that of an a udio mixer in a recording studio, deciding when each element should come in: "cue doorbell ," "cue theme," "cue singer,"
"cue dog food commercial, " "cue
telephone bell," etc. But it was
David Mamet who cued the entrances of various channels of his
play as he constructed the ·script.
He decided how to mix the Charles
Lang channel, with the chain letter
channel, with the Hall of Science
channel and the several other channels that together make up The
Water Engine. This process of layering or weaving language together
to make a poetic whole is, in effect,
The Cresset
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------------------~~-----the same technique Mamet uses to
bond his characters and their language together in a conversational
structure.
David Mamet is one of several
American playwrights searching for
new ways of structuring dramatic
language. The experimentation is
fascinating and occasionally entertaining. David Rabe's recent Hurly
Burly, for example, is a virtual
montage of words and phrases
drawn from the drug and entertainment culture of California and
exaggerated to a farcical level. It
must be said, however, that
dramatists who focus their attention on language at the expense of
plot risk neglecting the soul of
drama. Mamet's focus upon the
conversation is both a source of interest in his theatre and a reason
why many audience members will
find his theatre tedious. His lack of
attention to story will leave some
people unsatisfied, no matter how
well each conversation is played.

••
••

The Mad Girl
Her shadow stands
near the corner, clutches
a brown paper bag.
Her shadow has eyes,
smudge of wind filled sky
with whirling pigeons.
The shadow opens
its face, no tongue
for her to scream.
Her silence darts
up among the pigeons,
calling, calling.

B. R. Strahan
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Bringing It Home
By John Gehm. Chicago: Chicago
Review Press. 281 pp. $14.95.
Envisioning ourselves as a part of
history is not easy; ordinary life
seems too filled with lost pencils,
stupid quarrels, and miscellaneous
trivia to qualify for such an exalted
phrase. But we are history, however unlikely that may seem to us
at times, and books like John
Gehm's Bringing It Home can help
to convince us of that ineluctable
truth .
This book, whose author is an
alumnus of Valparaiso University,
is "a true story of the families who
moved from America's most brutal
public housing to all-white, smalltown Indiana." Along with those
words, the book jacket shows a
small color snapshot of a neat little
blue house surrounded by trees,
against a background of graffiti-covered brick wall. A telling piece of
graphics, for the contrast so clearly
presented here is the contrast that
shapes the book, and gives to its
narrative the impetus that can only
be provided by something true and
important. Gehm is telling history,
and the contrast is black and white.
His subject, on the surface, is
simple. A couple meets and becomes friends with a person in a
bad situation. She needs help; they
want to help. If she could move,
she'd be better off. So they and
their friends make arrangements to
help her move. She moves. Why
isn't the story that simple? Because

this is the late Sixties, the couple is
white, the person in a bad situation
is black, her situation is CabriniGreen, and the move is to Valparaiso, Indiana. Those realities of history change the story from one of
the simple logical series of events
that might have taken place to an
altogether different scenario.
Gehm's book aims to establish
those realities of history for the
reader. He describes CabriniGreen, as well as other public housing projects of the same era. He
describes the biography and almost
stereotypical career of the welfare
mother, his central character,
whom he calls Anstice Travers. He
describes the political climate of
Chicago under the thumb of Mayor
Richard J. Daley, and what happened when intelligent, curious,
and benevolent outsiders went to
Chicago to learn about modern
urban America. He describes the
university community from which
these intelligent, curious outsiders
came, and what happened when
they returned to that community
with what seemed their simple suggestion: why shouldn't one person
move from a terrible situation to a
better one if she has friends who
can help her do it? And he describes the larger community in
which the university was located,
the pleasant, tree-shaded streets
with parks and playgrounds, the
safe neighborhoods and prosperous
businesses.
Though all this description is excellent, the screen of false names is
distracting, at least to a person who
was there. The decision to clothe
the events of history with fictional
devices was no doubt made with
some care, for Gehm is far from
careless or ignorant. But the fictionalizing does not serve the book
well, nor does the corresponding
decision not to document material
in a traditional way. Somehow what
ought to be the hard thrust of
truth gets blunted. Did a member
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of Valparaiso's largest Lutheran
congregation really say that it
"didn't need any colored 'forced
down its throat' by 'certain radical
elements of the congregation' "? If
so, who said it? Why call it St.
Matthew's, when history would call
it Immanuel?
Gehm's chosen method involves
him in quotations like that above,
with all the problems that raises;
surely the careful reader wants to
know if the speaker used the word
"colored" or only the words "forced
down its throat." Which words are
remembered? Are any written
down? And in what source or
form? Problems of this kind
characterize the book, and, though
the approach is probably meant to
universalize the story, it seems
more often to work against the essential purposes of the book. Why
does Gehm appear to distrust the
particular, when his headnote,
from Kierkegaard, asserts that
"faith is in this paradox, that the
particular is higher than the universal"?
The outcome of Barbara Cotton's
sojourn in Valparaiso is not entirely
clear, either in the book, or in the
day-to-day version of history that
we tend to call reality. She's gone,
and the organization that gathered
itself to support her and other
families is also gone. The effects on
the community are uncertain; some
people still get angry when they
think about those years and struggles, many others don't remember
or have never heard of the Valparaiso Builders Association.
Did all that effort do any good?
Are the individuals whose lives
changed so radically for awhile any
better off today? The book's
epilogue is ambiguous; an account
of children and grandchildren
notes successes and failures, graduations and murders. Possibly these
particulars are better off than the
universals, since the ghettos exist
worse than ever, black poverty is at
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higher levels today than at any time
since 1965, black unemployment is
still far greater than white. Driving
on Chicago's South Side still exercises one's ability to sustain a belief
in America's "peace and plenty" in
the face of appalling poverty and
hopelessness.
What then does the book chronicle? More than anything else it
gives a picture of what it is like to
live and to work cheerfully for a
goal you cannot imagine. The
families in Bringing It Home believed that doing a good work
could not wait until one was certain
whether it would be worth it. Their
actions made are now history, but
their examples of faithfu l lives are
very present, and very necessary.

Cl Gail McGrew Eifrig

Power, Intimacy,
& the Life Story
By Dan P. McAdams. Homewood,
IL: Dorsey Press. 336 pp. $21.95.
Dan McAdams did his undergraduate work at Valparaiso University in the Christ College honors
program in humanities. This is the
first opportun ity that I have had to
review a book by a graduate of the
university where I teach. Fortunately it's a good book. I'd hate to
pan the work of a former student,
especially in a journal published by
this university. ot that I can take
much credit; McAdams was not
one of my students. Wou ld that he
had been. I wou ld like to bask in
some of his reflected glory.
This is a fine book by a social scientist who takes a fresh look at the
formation of identity. The term
identity has been made fami liar to
a whole generation of people both
inside and outside the scholarly
world by Erik Erikson, who describes identity as one among a
series of developmental tasks within

the life cycle. Though a lifelong
task of the personality, the critical
period for the formation of identity
is in the period of adolescence and
early adu lthood. The term has become immensely popular throughout the culture because it seems to
have captured what many think is
the central quest of a whole generation, a search for "who I am" and
"where I'm going" and a yearning
for a sense of sameness and continuity in a highly pluralistic world.
McAdams understands the problem of identity to be the problem
of unity and purpose in human
lives. He uses the metaphor of
story to reinterpret and expand
Erikson's understanding of identity
as a developmental task within the
human life cycle. According to
McAdams, an individual's story has
the power to tie together past, present, and future in his or her life.
It is a story which is able to provide
unity and purpose. His book
"examines the proposition that, beginning in late adolescence, we construct stories to integrate the di parate elements of our lives."
Identity is a life story, a configuration of plot, character, setting,
scene, and theme. Identity stability
is consistency in a life story. Identity transformation is story revision,
which may range from minor editing to a total recasting of the entire
drama. The problem of identity,
then, is "the problem of arriving at
a life story that makes sense-provides unity and purpose-within a
socio-historical matrix that embodies a much larger story."
McAdams explores the life myths
or stories that people construct to
serve as their identities. He draws
upon a variety of theoretical
sources inside and outside psychology, as well as interviews, questionnaires, and psychological tests administered to men and women in
' the college years and at midlife.
With these sources McAdams develops a model of identity as nar-
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rative constJ;"uction. The model
specifies four major components of
the life story (nuclear episodes, imagoes, ideological setting, and
generativity script) and demonstrates how two personality variables (power and intimacy) influence and are influenced by the
content and structure of the story.

Individuals high in
power motivation are
likely to emphasize
themes of impact and
strength (physical ,
mental, and relational)
in their life stories.

McAdams
understands
his
analysis to be in the tradition of
personology, which emphasizes the
study of the whole person in his or
her sociohistorical context. Whole
person, biography, and motivation
are three major themes of the personological tradition, and each of
those is prominent in McAdams'
approach to the study of persons.
Henry Murray is the father of this
school, and David McClelland
(McAdams' mentor) is its most
prominent contemporary exponent.
It was from McClelland that
McAdams drew the inspiration to
ask the "big questions"-questions
about the relationship between
identity and the social motives of
power and intimacy-and design
methodologies and measurement
techniques for examining these
questions in disciplined empirical
ways.
One of the strengths of the author's treatment is the thorough
empirical grounding which he gives
to his model of identity as narrative construction. The model
would be intriguing if it were
nothing more than a reworking of
other theoretical models, and parSeptember, 1985

ticularly Erikson's model. McAdams
is too much of an empiricist to be
satisfied with that, and his book is
loaded with references to empirical
studies, many of them done by
himself, which substantiate his findings. At the same time he is aware
that many readers are put off by
scholars who report such stud ies
with too much attention to detail
and technical language. Any educated person can follow McAdams'
analysis with ease. Most of the
studies are fairly simple and the
findings readily accessible. Technical information concerning the collection and analysis of data is
placed in appendixes.
Besides the simple and compelling idea of understanding identity
as life story, I was most intrigued
by the thesis that the motives of
power and intimacy serve as organizing principles for life stories.
Individuals high in power motivation are likely to emphasize themes
of impact and strength (physical,
mental, and interpersonal) in their
life stories, whereas those high in
intimacy motivation can be expected to structure their identities
by relationships with others characterized by warmth, closeness, and
communion. Power and intimacy as
dominant human motivations are
very similar to Freud's love and
work, Rollo May's love and will,
and David Bakan's communion and
agency.
What is unique
to
McAdams is the empirical grounding he supplies for these terms and
the way in which he relates them to
his understanding of identity as
narrative construction.
Power, Intimacy, & the Life Story
is a must for anyone who is interested in life-cycle theory. McAdams
manages to integrate an impressive
amount of the theoretical and empirical work done in this area into
his comprehensive treatment of the
subject. The only criticism I have
of his work is that his reports of
the work of others, though clear

and readable, are lengthy and
often tedious. However, one can
scan sections of fami liar material
witho ut getting bogged down.
Valparaiso University has many
grad uates who have done exceptional work in widely diversified
areas of service and professional
achievement. We are proud of
them all , but those who serve in an
academic institution have a special
measure of pride when one of their
own achieves prominence as a
scholar since that is the behavior
we model. With the writing of this
book McAdams has achieved that
prominence and will continue to be
heard from for many years to
come.

C: Thomas A. Droege

Amber
I always had
amber dreams
but you are
cream,
a texture
they make
pots from
and china for
the dinner table.
You add
strawberries,
blueberries,
fine veins
in your breast.
A wisp of
dark gold
caresses
your shou lder.
This amber
is enough.

B. R. Strahan
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Life in the
Slow Lane
Dot Nuechterlein
Several months ago I spent some
time on crutches. Now far be it
from me to complain, but it was
not what I would call a terrific way
to get around.
O nce I had a friend whose favorite expression was: "Every experience is a learning experience."
Since I did learn a few things from
being a hobbler, I thought it best to
pass along this accumulated wisdom as a public service.
First let me hasten to assure you
that my injury was not serious. In
fact, the people I live with seemed
to find the whole bit extremely uproarious-except, of course, for the
part involving their waiting on me
hand and foot.
Admittedly their amusement
started because of the incident that
brought those wooden pegs into
our household. As I explained to
curious inquirers at the time, I
tried to catch a ball with my foot, a
not recommended procedure.
People who know me are aware
that I have none of the skills required to play softball. My one
physical ability is to be able to run
a fairly long way without falling
down, but that's nothing to brag
about since it contributes nothing
at all to the sport in question.
When my team has a warm-up
practice I manage to catch several
of the balls tossed in my direction,
although there is orne difficulty
throwing them back to the same vicinity in which my partner is standing. Things are better at the plate:
I don't strike out very often, probably because in women 's softball
the ball must by law be pitched so
that it gently floats over the plate.
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Anyone who can see can usually
connect-except that in my case the
ball doesn't move very far. My batting average has only one number
in it, the round one.
My team is made up of people
roughly half my age, and most of
them have tons of talent. The sole
reason they let me join was to avoid
forfeiting games if some players
are away. I make a pretty decent
cheering section on the bench, and
I know how to keep score.
The team's big problem comes
when they are shorthanded and
have to use me. Given my non-acquaintance with aim, pitching is out
of the question, and the infield
needs speedy, accurate throws. So I
become one of the four outfielders,
the go-fer for the balls that sail
overhead.
Only one didn't, and being mindful of images of silly women who
scream and jump out of the way
when a ball comes near them, I
didn't budge. The only trouble is
my glove was in the wrong place,
on my hand instead of on my
ankle. Thus the crutches.
I shall not insult your intelligence
by telling you to avoid getting into
such a state in the first place. My
advice is intended to help you cope
should you ever find yourself with
these long,
kinny appendages
growing out of your armpits.
(1) Try very hard to live in a
one-floor building. Ours i splitlevel, one of those houses where
everything is always on the other
floor from where you are, even in
the best of times.
(2) In fact, might I recommend
a world without stairs altogether?
Terror, I have discovered , is looking down a long flight of steps and
seeing not even a handrail to grasp.
Going up is even worse. The best
way to navigate in either direction
is to sit down and bump along on
your whatever, but that is not really
suitable in public places, and besides, bare stairs aren't much fun .

(3) Actually, universal shag carpeting would be ideal, if you can
arrange it.
(4) Equip yourself with a backpack that you can wear on your
front. Hands occupied in bearing
weight and maintaining balance
cannot also carry things. But a
shou lder bag or tote tends to flap
around, and a backpack on the
back is un-get-at-able. Pay no attention to the stares and grins.
(5) Be warned-everything will
take ten times as long as usual, and
your independence will vanish. On
the other hand, it can be a great
excuse to get out of some of your
usual chores. I had nearly forgotten what it was like to lie around
reading novels, sipping cool things.
(6) Finally, it helps to have a
sympathetic family. At least I imagine it would be very soothing to
hear some oohing and ahing. I got
that sort of thing from a few
friends, although others developed
uncontrollable giggles as I jumped
around like a wounded jackrabbit.
But it was the folks at home who
came perilously close to getting
crutch marks on the skull. I think
it was the remarks made when I
crawled on hands and knees that
g~t the most tedious. Or maybe the
cute comments about old people
playing kids' games getting what
they asked for. Not to mention the
"Gimp" and "Spas" and "Hopalong" stuff.
Of course it wasn't an easy time
for them, either. They did keep me
fed and clothed, and nobody ever
outright refused to fetch and carry
for me, so I guess I should really
give them all little gold stars and
promise undying gratitude.
Anyway, even if you never hold a
crutch in your hand, let alone use
it, try to have a little compassion
for those who do.
And if you are one of those for
whom crutches or canes or wheelchairs or whatever are a way of life,
God bless you, friend.
Cl
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